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ABSTRACT
Tax-Induced Earnings Management, Auditor Conservatism, and Tax Enforcement
by
LI Yongbo
Master of Philosophy

Prompted by the recent statutory corporate income tax-rate reduction in China, in this
study I investigate whether the constraining effect that quality auditors have on
tax-related discretionary current accruals (DCA) differs for two sub-groups of listed
firms with tax incentives to manage earnings upward versus downward. I also
explore whether the effectiveness of tax authority scrutiny (i.e. tax enforcement) on
DCA differs for the same two groups.
I find that the firms’ two external monitors are sensitive to the direction of
managerial incentives for earnings management. Specifically, higher-quality auditors
are associated with smaller amounts of reported DCA and this association is stronger
for firms with incentives to manage earnings upward and weaker for those with
incentives to manage earnings downward, although the accrual decisions for all of
the firms are driven by the same tax reporting incentives. The results are consistent
with the notion that due to concerns with legal liability and reputation loss, auditors
have incentives to ensure that firms report earnings conservatively. I also find a
significantly positive association between tax enforcement and reported DCA for
firms with incentives to manage earnings downward. This suggests that tax
authorities constrain corporate accruals management that is likely to result in tax
revenue loss. Taken together, my results suggest that a spillover effect exists between
auditors and tax authorities, such that the two monitoring bodies compensate for each
other’s lack of monitoring in one direction of accruals management. My results are
robust to a set of sensitivity tests and have implications for academic researchers,
policy makers, and capital market investors.
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Tax-induced Earnings Management, Auditor Conservatism, and Tax
Enforcement

“A government big enough to give you everything you want is a government big
enough to take from you everything you have.”
------Gerald Ford, the 38th President of the United States, Address to a joint session
of Congress August 12, 1974.
“It’s human nature that people are going to fight harder to preserve a benefit they
already have than to get some new benefit.”
------Clint Stretch, a principal at Deloitte Tax and a former counsel to the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation. [Abstracted from David Kocieniewski
“U.S. Business Has High Tax Rates but Pays Less” The New York Times May 2,
2011.]
“It is an extreme case, but it’s hardly the only company that pays far less than the
much-quoted federal corporate tax rate of 35 percent. Of the 500 big companies in
the well-known Standard & Poor’s stock index, 115 paid a total corporate tax
rate—both federal and otherwise—of less than 20 percent over the last five years,
according to an analysis of company reports done for The New York Times by
Capital IQ, a research firm. Thirty-nine of those companies paid a rate less than 10
percent.”
------David Leonhardt, “The Paradox of Corporate Taxes” The New York Times
February 1, 2011.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Auditors and tax authorities are two important external monitors of corporate reports,
but they do not share a common focus. Auditors care about the true and fair
presentation of financial reports while tax authorities are concerned with potential
tax misreporting. In this study, I examine whether these two monitors differentially
constrain tax-related discretionary current accruals (DCA) in light of an anticipated

1

change in income tax rates in China.1 Studies suggest that due to high litigation
costs and concern with reputation loss, auditors tend to be more skeptical (liberal)
about their clients’ income-increasing (income-decreasing) accounting choices (St.
Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Hirst, 1994; Lys and Watts, 1994; Francis and Krishnan,
1999; Heninger, 2001; Kim et al., 2003). I call this “auditor conservatism” in this
paper. In contrast, tax authorities are more concerned with the accounting choices
that decrease taxable income. To examine the differential constraining effects of
auditors and tax authorities, I identify two distinct groups of listed firms with a clear
incentive to manage earnings upward or downward for tax purposes. Because
financial transactions have simultaneous influences on taxable income and financial
reporting earnings (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006), there are likely to be some
overlaps in monitoring between auditors and tax authorities. I expect these overlaps
to create a spillover effect for these two parties on constraining the tax-induced
accruals manipulation. Specifically, tax authorities’ close scrutiny of firms’
income-decreasing activities has a spillover effect that could compensate for the lack
of monitoring on the part of auditors, and the intensification of auditor monitoring of
clients’ income-increasing accounting choices also has a positive spillover effect on
the quality of corporate tax reporting.

My study is motivated by evidence from two auditing and tax research streams.
Previous auditing research shows that higher-quality auditors (proxy by big N or
industry specialization) are associated with less accruals-based earnings management
for clients (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan,
2003), and that they are conservative about firms’ income-increasing accounting

1

China’s new Enterprise Income Tax Law, introduced on March 16, 2007 took effect on January 1,
2008 (details provided in Chapter 2).
2

choices due to the perceived asymmetrically high litigation cost resulting from
potential audit failure (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Kinney and Martin, 1994;
Hirst, 1994; Lys and Watts, 1994; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Heninger, 2001).
Kim et al. (2003) extend this line of research by providing evidence that the
effectiveness of high-quality auditors is differentiated by the divergence or
convergence of reporting incentives between firms and their auditors. They define
divergence as managers overstating reported earnings, which conflicts with auditors’
conservative practices, and convergence is defined as managers understating
reported earnings, which is preferred by auditors.2 The sample classification for
firms with incentives to manage upward or downward earnings in their study is
based on the income-smoothing theory developed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1995). It
states that managers have incentives to smooth income across periods to maximize
expected utility.3

Recent tax research suggests that tax enforcement plays an important role within the
agency framework (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Desai et al., 2007), having both a
direct effect on curtailing corporate tax avoidance (Hoopes et al., 2012) and a
spillover effect on constraining opportunistic financial reporting (Hanlon et al.,
2012). As a result, increased tax authority scrutiny can mitigate the agency and
information problems that are valued by the capital market (Guedhami and Pittman,
2008; Ghoul et al., 2011). Although Hoopes et al. (2012) provide evidence of tax
In this paper, similar to the definitions in Kim et al. (2003), I define divergence as a firm’s reporting
preference conflicting with that of a monitor and convergence as the reporting preferences of firm and
monitor being parallel.
3
Within the framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), if managers’ tenures are subject to current
performance, then they have incentive to boost current earnings in poor times by borrowing against
future earnings to mitigate the likelihood of dismissal. In contrast, due to the information decay
phenomenon, current good performance does not necessarily compensate for future poor performance.
Thus, managers have incentive to save current earnings in good times for use in future poor times.
Based on this theory, Kim et al. (2003) construct a relative performance-based indicator to
differentiate managers’ incentives to boost or reduce reported earnings in the main test.
3
2

enforcement’s first-order curtailing effect, they do not suggest the way through
which tax avoidance is constrained. Likewise, while Hanlon et al. (2012) document
the tax enforcement’s second-order spillover effect on firms’ reported accruals, they
do not consider the effects of the divergence or convergence of preferences between
tax authorities and firms regarding directional accounting choices. Although firms
have incentives to improve shareholder value through tax expense reduction, tax
authorities have incentives to tackle corporate activities that lead to tax revenue loss.
Therefore, the extent of tax authority scrutiny is likely to differ between
income-increasing and -decreasing economic activities. This results in tax
enforcement’s direct curtailing and indirect spillover effects being strengthened
when close scrutiny is executed on transactions that lower taxable income, and
weakened when less concern is given to activities that increase current tax payment.
Previous research implicitly assumes that the constraining effect of tax enforcement
is constant across directional accounting choices. I relax this assumption by
incorporating the divergence or convergence of incentives between tax authorities
and firms into the study.

The 2008 corporate income tax reform in China provides a natural setting in which
to concurrently study income-increasing and -decreasing accruals management
induced by a change in the tax rate. To complement Kim et al. (2003) from a tax
reporting perspective, I first hypothesize that there is a significantly negative
association between audit quality and reported DCA for a sub-group of firms with
incentives to manage earnings upward, but this association is weaker for the group of
firms with incentives to manage earnings downward. I then extend recent tax
enforcement studies (e.g. Hoopes et al., 2012; Hanlon et al., 2012) by examining the
differential effectiveness of tax authority scrutiny on corporate financial reporting
4

strategies. Specifically, because tax authorities are more concerned with
income-decreasing accruals that may reduce tax payments, I further hypothesize that
there is a significantly positive association between tax enforcement and tax-related
DCA for the sub-group of firms with tax incentives to manage earnings downward.
However, I do not expect to find this association for the sub-group of firms with the
incentive to manage earnings upward, thus paying more taxes in the current period.
Because auditors and tax authorities have different focus and their monitoring
overlaps to some extent, I expect to find a spillover effect between these two parties
on limiting the extent of reported DCA. Consistent with my hypotheses, the
empirical results provide support for all of these arguments, and they are robust to a
set of sensitivity tests.

My results contribute to the literature in three ways. First, unlike previous research
that examines auditor conservatism in the income-increasing or -decreasing accruals
management setting (e.g. Hirst, 1994), my study makes inferences about differential
auditor conservatism based on the results obtained from a single setting provided by
an exogenous event (i.e. tax reform) applicable to all sample firms. This mitigates
the potential omitted variables and measurement errors resulting from confounding
effects (other than tax incentives) encountered in separate studies. Second, because
previous research implicitly assumes that the extent of tax authority scrutiny is
constant across directional accruals (e.g. Hanlon et al., 2012), my study contributes
to the tax enforcement literature by considering the divergence or convergence of
preferences between firms and tax authorities regarding the directional accounting
choices. My results provide a reference for future tax inspectors’ training and
administration, supporting that more attention be given to firms’ transactions that
increase the current taxable income but may lower tax payment over time. Third, my
5

study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that auditor monitoring and
tax authority scrutiny share spillover effects on constraining directional accruals
manipulation for tax purposes.

My results have implications for the accounting profession, tax authorities, and
capital market investors. When monitoring clients’ income-decreasing accounting
choices that reduce current taxable income, auditors could benefit from the increased
monitoring role of tax authorities. Similarly, tax authorities may benefit from
intensified

auditor

monitoring

on

tax-induced

income-increasing

accruals

manipulation that lower future tax payment. Finally, capital market investors benefit
from the supplementary roles that auditors and tax authorities play in limiting the
extent of corporate earnings management, thereby increasing the credibility of
financial reporting and decreasing the potential rent diversion.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the
institutional background. Chapter 3 reviews the previous research. Chapter 4
develops the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the data sources and sample selection
procedures. Chapter 6 outlines the research methodologies. Chapter 7 reports the
descriptive and empirical results, followed by a discussion of a set of sensitivity tests
conducted in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 concludes the paper, with a discussion on its
contributions and implications. Finally, Chapter 10 explains the limitations and
suggestions for future research.

6

Chapter 2

Institutional Background—China Corporate Income Tax Reform

Before 2008, there were two different enterprise income tax laws in China, which
were designed and applied separately for domestic enterprises and foreign
investment enterprises (FIEs).4 Under the old laws, a statutory income tax rate of
33% was applied to both domestic enterprises and FIEs. In addition, a set of tax
preferences and deductions were granted to them, although the extent of these
incentives and the coverage of preferential policies were different for the two types
of enterprises. In general, the government provided fewer tax preferences to
domestic enterprises. However, similar to FIEs, domestic enterprises also enjoyed
lower tax rates (typically 15%) or tax holidays (e.g. 2-year exemption and 3-year
half payment) if they operated in targeted regions and industries (e.g. 5 special
economic zones, 32 economic and technology development zones, and 52 high-tech
development zones), although the overall coverage of tax preferences was lower than
that of FIEs. For domestic enterprises, whether tax preferences are granted is
determined mainly by their business locations, the industries in which they engage,
and/or by their type of investment and nature of business. For example, if domestic
enterprises are located in special economic zones and inland regions, or if they
operate in “encouraged” industries (such as Agricultural and Information
Technology), they could enjoy a reduced income tax rate (generally 15%).5 Firms
can also benefit from other preferences dependent on investment type (e.g. resource
comprehensive utilization and technical renovation) and nature of business (e.g.

Domestic enterprises were subject to Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on
Enterprises Income Tax (Order No. 137 of the State Council, effective January 1, 1994) while foreign
investment enterprises were subject to Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (Order No. 45 of the President of the
PRC, effective July 1, 1991).
5
Newly established business may enjoy the “3-year exemption,” “5-year exemption,” “2-year
exemption and 3-year half payment,” “3-year exemption and 2-year half payment,” or “3-year
exemption and 7-year half payment” privileges from the start of production and/or operation if they
are located in specifically listed less-developed regions or industries.
7
4

welfare, tour, and educational enterprises). Substantial differential tax incentive
policies for FIEs and domestic enterprises not only contribute to the relatively unfair
tax burdens of domestic enterprises, but also to the large disparity between nominal
statutory income tax rate and real effective tax rate for the two types of firms.6

To create a level playing field and a standardized and transparent fiscal environment
that favors fair competition for all enterprises country-wide, China introduced the
new Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on March 16,
2007, and it took effect on January 1, 2008. Guided by the principle of “simple tax
system, broad tax base, low tax rate, and tough enforcement,” the new tax law was
promulgated to unify the application scope, tax rate, tax deductions, and preferential
tax policies for both domestic enterprises and FIEs. Under the new tax law system, a
unified standard tax rate of 25% is applied to all businesses operating in China.
Although most of the existing tax incentives enjoyed by domestic enterprises and
FIEs were terminated through a limited grandfathering relief (No. 39 of the State
Council, 2007),7 a new set of industry-oriented tax incentives supplemented by
regional ones was introduced.8 In addition, the new law introduced “special tax
6

Under the old laws, FIEs enjoyed more favorable and preferential treatment than did domestic
enterprises with respect to tax preference and deduction policies. According to the national survey
data disclosed by the Minister of Finance, the average real enterprise income tax rate for FIEs is 15%,
about 10 percentage points lower than that for domestic enterprises (Jin, 2007).
7
Specifically, according to No. 39 of the State Council, 2007, enterprises that were enjoying a 15%
income tax rate before January 1, 2008 were able to apply rates of 18% in 2008, 20% in 2009, 22% in
2010, and 24% in 2011, before being subject to the full 25% rate in 2012. Firms that had been using a
24% rate applied the 25% rate in 2008. Enterprises that enjoyed limited-duration preferential tax
treatments before January 1, 2008 such as the “2-year exemption and 3-year half payment” and the
“5-year exemption and five-year half payment” privileges continued to enjoy them until they expired
as originally provided. However, for firms that were unable to enjoy such preferences due to a failure
to make profits, the terms for applying the preferences were to be dated from January 1, 2008. The
items and scope of the transitional preferential policies are given in the “Table for the Implementation
of Transitional Preferential Enterprise Income Tax Policies,” together with the State Council’s notice.
8
For example, under the new law, if firms are in the farming, forestry, animal husbandry, or fishery
industries, they could enjoy a 50% reduction in or exemption of income tax; if firms are in high/new
technology industries, they could enjoy a 15% preferential tax rate; if firms derive income from
environmental protection or energy/water conservation projects, they may enjoy the “3-year
exemption and 3-year half payment” tax preferences, etc.
8

adjustments” to strengthen measures against tax evasion.

As discussed, domestic enterprises operating in certain locations and industries
enjoyed preferential tax treatment that resulted in the firms’ effective tax rates being
significantly lower than the nominal tax rate under the old tax law regime. Hence,
the new law unified the statutory income tax rate to a flat rate of 25% (reduced from
33%) and terminated most of the preferences under the old law. This means that
some firms were confronted with a potential tax rate increase or decrease, depending
on whether their current effective tax rates are lower or higher than the statutory rate
(i.e. 25%). Therefore, the promulgation of the new enterprise income tax law
provides domestic listed firms with tax incentives to manage earnings upward
(downward) in response to the potential effective tax rates increase (decrease).9 This
setting provides me with an opportunity to concurrently study the roles of external
monitors (i.e. auditor and tax authority) on constraining corporate directional
earnings management activities. I therefore conduct this study under the China
tax-rate-cut setting.

9

Instead of examining domestic enterprises and FIEs together, I exclusively study domestic listed
firms, as FIEs are excluded from being an exchange-listed firm by definition under the Income Tax
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign
Enterprises.
9

Chapter 3

Literature Review

My study is primarily related to three streams of research, namely earnings
management, auditor conservatism, and tax enforcement. Reviews of these areas
follow.

3.1. Earnings Management
3.1.1. General Earnings Management Studies
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368), “Earnings management occurs when
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on
reported accounting numbers.” Under this definition, there are two types of earnings
management strategies: accruals- and real transactions-based earnings management.
Accruals-based earnings management (AM) is normally regarded as managing
accounting accruals within the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
frame, whereas real transactions-based earnings management (RM) is defined as
“departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals”
(Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 337). From the traditional economics-based perspective,
RM differs from AM in that the former has lower detection costs but higher direct
cash flow effects (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin,
2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Kothari et al., 2012).

Since the 1980s, academic researchers have focused on how to detect AM,
documenting substantive evidence as a result. Because the detection of AM requires
the estimation of discretionary components of reported accruals, studies propose and
10

develop a set of empirical models for the estimation.10 Various estimation models
are proposed by Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), and Jones (1991). For example,
Healy (1985) argues that systematic earnings management occurs in every period,
such that AM can be detected by comparing mean total accruals across the earnings
management partitioning variable. Similarly, by using the last period’s total accruals
as the measure of nondiscretionary accruals, DeAngelo (1986) estimates AM as the
change in total accruals. At this point, DeAngelo’s method is a special case of
Healy’s model. While both Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) implicitly assume
that nondiscretionary accruals are constant, Jones (1991) relaxes this assumption and
proposes a new model that controls for the effects of changes in firms’ economic
circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals. However, as Jones (1991) implicitly
assumes that revenue is nondiscretionary, measurement error exists if management
exercises discretion over revenue. Hence, a modified version of Jones’s model is
proposed by Dechow et al. (1995); specifically, it implicitly assumes that all changes
in credit sales in the event period result from manipulation and thus adjusts the
revenue component of estimation by excluding changes in credit sales. Dechow et al.
(2003) also propose a forward-looking abnormal accrual model that adjusts for the
expected growth effects of credit sales and inventory and the predictable effects of
last year’s accruals. In addition, because earnings management may vary with firm
performance, Kothari et al. (2005) proposes a performance-matched method for
detecting earnings management, but it is only effective when the correlated omitted
variable is matched and their matching method reduces the test power by increasing
the standard error of the test statistics, as discussed by Dechow et al. (2012). The
recent study by Dechow et al. (2012) further proposes a new approach to detecting
10

In addition to the models introduced here, there are several other approaches to detecting AM, such
as the industry method proposed by Dechow and Sloan (1991), the balance sheet method of Barton
and Simko (2002), and the deferred tax expense method of Phillips et al. (2003).
11

AM by incorporating the timing reversal effect of accruals.

Through the aforementioned models, researchers provide large amounts of
AM-related evidence to answer research questions in different settings (e.g.
McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Jones, 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Warfield
et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998; Erickson and Wang, 1999; Dechow
and Skinner, 2000; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippoin, 2006).
For example, Jones (1991) finds that during the import relief investigations, U.S.
firms manage earnings downward via accruals to obtain the benefit of tariff increases
and quota reductions. In contrast, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that firms make
income-increasing accruals in the year before the violation of a debt covenant.
Erickson and Wang (1999) note that before signing a merger agreement, acquiring
firms manage earnings upward via accruals to increase their stock prices to reduce
the acquisition cost. Similarly, Cheng and Warfield (2005) provide evidence that
CEOs with high-equity incentives manage accruals upward to increase the value of
their stock options. Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) suggest that discretionary
accrual manipulations could help explain the poor stock price and earnings
performance in the post-seasoned equity offering period.

In contrast to the AM research, RM received scant attention in the early period with
a few exceptions that mainly considered some specific types of transactions. 11
However, alongside the increased regulation and enforcement generated by the

11

During this period, limited evidence of RM was obtained mainly through the identification of
specific transactions, such as the manipulation of R&D spending (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Perry and
Grinaker, 1994), the managing of inventory and sales (Dhaliwal et al., 1994), the selling of long-term
assets (Bartov, 1993), the re-structuring of operating and capital lease (Imhoff and Thomas, 1988), the
repurchasing of stock options (Hribar et al., 2006), and the manipulation of financial derivatives
(Barton, 2001).
12

worldwide corporate scandals in the early 2000s,12 RM began to take center stage
due to its low detection cost (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Badertscher et
al., 2011). Although RM is relatively harder than AM to scrutinize and detect
through internal governance mechanisms, external auditors, and regulatory
authorities, it also results in significant costs to the firm (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010;
Kothari et al., 2012; Ge and Kim, 2013; Kim and Sohn, 2013). For example, Ge and
Kim (2013) find that RM increases the cost of U.S. corporations’ new bond issues.
Kim and Sohn (2013) also find that RM is positively associated with the cost of
implied equity capital, after controlling for AM. Hence, the choice of AM or RM
depends on the firm’s strategic decisions. However, two recent studies provide some
insights into the relationship between AM and RM. Specifically, Cohen and Zarowin
(2010) document that firms’ earnings management choices around seasoned new
equity offerings vary predictably as a function of the cost and their ability to use AM.
Meanwhile, Zang (2012) proposes and provides evidence of a substitutive
relationship between AM and RM; that is, the trade-off decision depends on their
relative costs and the level of AM is adjusted based on the level of RM.

One focus of my study is to examine the differences in the effectiveness of quality
auditors’ constraint of corporate earnings management activities. Because studies
(e.g. Graham et al., 2005; Chi et al., 2011; Yu, 2008) do not find auditors to play a
significant role in constraining firms’ RM activities (which are difficult to detect), I
construct the earnings management metric based on the traditional accruals measure.
There are two reasons why auditors are less interested in and concerned with RM.

12

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, several large corporate frauds and scandals such as
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco came to light in the U.S., which led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX,
July 30, 2002). The passage of the SOX represents a fundamental change in the U.S. from
disclosure-orientated to virtually controlled security regulations.
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First, as RM is defined as “departure from normal operational practices”
(Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 37), it is not established as a violation of GAAP, if it is
truly and fairly presented in the financial reports. Hence, RM does not interest
auditors, who are mainly concerned with potential GAAP violations (PwC, 2013).
Second, as managers could easily defend that abnormal activities are the result of
firms’ business and operating decisions, it is difficult for auditors to justify the
existence of earnings manipulation through real operations.

3.1.2. Tax-induced Earnings Management Studies
The research on tax-induced earnings management examines both accruals- and real
activities-based earnings manipulations for tax purposes (Gramlich, 1991; Scholes et
al., 1992; Guenther, 1994; Maydew, 1997; Lopez et al., 1998; Mamuneas and Nadiri,
1996; Bloom et al., 2002). The majority of studies use a specific setting (e.g. the
alternative minimum tax book income adjustment or the Tax Reform Act of 1986) to
examine the issue in the U.S. For example, Gramlich (1991) provides evidence that
firms used income-increasing accruals to boost income in 1986 (the last year
preceding the tax on book income) and income-decreasing accruals to lower income
in 1987 (the initial year of a book income levy) in response to the adjustment policy
change. Similarly, Guenther (1994) documents that U.S. multinational firms make
income-decreasing accruals in response to the reduction in the statutory corporate
income tax rate. Under the same setting, Lopez et al. (1998) provide further evidence
that firms’ tax aggressive positions are directly and positively related to the
probability of making negative discretionary current accruals, and the magnitude of
income shifting is a function of the tax-rate changes faced by the firms. Concurrent
with the tax-induced AM studies, tax-induced RM studies also examine corporate
reporting behavior in the same setting. For instance, Scholes et al. (1992) find that
14

firms defer profit via sales (not through selling, general, and administrative
expenditures) in anticipation of the tax rate cut. In addition to Scholes et al. (1992),
Maydew (1997) finds that firms with net operating loss carrybacks defer operating
income and recognize more nonrecurring losses, to enjoy an increase in tax refunds
from pre-1986 high-tax years.

3.1.3. Tax-induced Earnings Management Studies in China
Consistent with research findings in the U.S., Chinese studies also find that tax
incentives induce firms to manage earnings for tax savings purposes. For example,
Chan and Mo (2000) provide evidence that a firm’s compliance behavior is
associated with its tax-holiday position, and such association is different across
industries. In addition, the expiration of tax-holiday positions can also trigger firms
to manage earnings upward before the event year to save on tax (Lin, 2006). Studies
also show that to avoid the increased tax burden, some firms move their locations of
registration to lower-tax regions (Wu et al., 2007). Likewise, consolidated groups
shift their income across subsidiaries operating in different regions via related party
transactions (Lo et al., 2010; Shevlin et al., 2012; Lin et al. 2013). Two recent
Chinese studies provide further evidence of the tax-rate-cut’s effect on corporate
reporting. Specifically, Lin et al. (2012) document that in response to the
announcement of a tax rate change under the new income tax law in 2008, Chinese
listed firms with marginal tax rates above the statutory rate (25%) deferred revenue
recognition via negative accruals in 2007 to save more tax throughout the year. Lin
et al. (2014) also show that such tax-triggered activities are much stronger among
private than among public firms, as the former face lower financial reporting costs.

Similar to previous studies, my study also uses the tax-rate-cut as a setting to
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examine corporate reporting behavior. In contrast, I examine whether auditors and
tax authorities exhibit differential foci on constraining income-increasing versus
-decreasing accruals motivated by a tax-rate-based incentive.

3.2. Auditor Conservatism
3.2.1. Auditor Quality
DeAngelo (1981) argues that large auditors (proxy by number of clients) provide a
higher level of perceived audit quality due to the client-specific quasi-rents earned.
In other words, large auditors are supposed to be less influenced by any individual
client, and thus are regarded as more economically independent (high quality).
Meanwhile, if an audit failure occurs, large auditors have more to lose due to the
potential negative effects on the reputation of its entire clientele (Dopuch and
Simunic, 1980). Along these lines, numerous studies use the international big N
auditors as the dichotomous classification of high- and low-quality audit firms
(Simunic and Stein, 1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Craswell et al. 1995; Becker et
al., 1998; Kim et al., 2003) because large auditors are regarded as having established
brand name reputations and the incentives to protect themselves from reputation loss.
By using big N as a proxy for auditor size, research also provides corroborative
support for the argument that large audit firms are correlated with high audit quality,
as they are less involved in the litigation suits and regulatory sanctions (Palmrose,
1988; Feroz et al., 1991) and as their audit reports are perceived as having greater
predictive accuracy (Lennox, 1999; Weber and Willenborg, 2003).

The research on auditor quality is also parallel with the development of the audit
industry. Between 1976 and 1993, the concentration levels of audit firms in the
industries and those of industry market leaders identified at the beginning of the year
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increased (Hogan and Jeter, 1999). This time trend change in the audit industry
indicates the existence of return for investing in industry specialization, which is
confirmed by a number of studies (Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002;
Ferguson et al., 2003). For example, taking advantage of audit fees disclosure,13
Craswell et al. (1995) find that Big 8 auditors in Australia earned premiums for both
brand name and national industry specialization in the mid-1980s, 14 but the
premiums declined in the post-big N merger period in the early 1990s and
completely disappeared in 1998 (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). 15 In contrast to
Ferguson and Stokes (2002), Ferguson et al. (2003) rank auditor industry
specialization based on market share within each industry (instead of arbitrary
market share thresholds) and find that the audit fee premium for industry
specialization in Australia is primarily driven by the city-level industry leadership in
city-specific audit markets. 16 Based on the research framework developed by
Ferguson et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2005) examine the pricing of Big 5 industry
specialization in the U.S. for the 2000-2001 fiscal years, during which the U.S. firms
begin making fee disclosures and providing evidence generally consistent with that

In Australia, audit fees must be disclosed in firms’ annual reports. However, this was not the case
in the U.S. until 2000. Since 2001, audit fees of firms with fiscal year-ends in December 2000 must be
disclosed (Francis et al., 2005).
14
However, as discussed by Craswell et al. (1995), their result is sensitive to the different
market-share rules of industry specialization. In other words, their result may be spurious as a
consequence of the arbitrary cutoff.
15
There are two potential reasons for the disappeared audit fee premiums. First, as a consequence of
merges among Big N accounting firms, the difference in market share becomes insignificant, which in
turn results in the equally regarded for industry specialization by the market. Second, the merger
results in economic scales, which lead to the reduction of audit fees if clients receive cost saving
benefits from auditors (Ferguson et al., 2003).
16
Under the firm-wide perspective, it “considers an accounting firm’s practice in aggregate, typically
at the country-level of analysis. The firm is the focal point and no differentiation is presumed to exist
across the individual practice offices of the firm” and under the office-level perspective, it “views
each individual practice office in the Big 5 network as a unique and relevant unit of analysis in its
own right because audit contracting is conducted through local offices, audit engagements are
administered by an audit team typically located in an office in the same city as the client’s
headquarters, and audit reports are issued on office-specific letterhead of the Big 5 engagement office
administering the audit” (Ferguson et al. 2003, p. 430). For more discussion, please also see Francis et
al. (2005) and Reichelt and Wang (2010).
17
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of Ferguson et al. (2003). 17 Fung et al. (2012) find that auditor industry
specialization premiums exist even after controlling for the economic scales.18 They
also provide evidence that such industry specialization premiums are higher in the
post- than in the pre-SOX period. The price discount from economies of scale shows
an opposite pattern.

Although these studies largely focus on the ex-ante estimation of auditor quality
(auditor size, brand name, and industry specialization), studies also consider ex-post
outcomes (e.g. audit opinion) as a proxy for auditor quality. In this direction,
previous research examines the effectiveness of using audit reports to predict
bankruptcy, prompting mixed results (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Francis and
Krishnan, 2002).19 Previous research also examines the informational value of audit
reports (Loudder et al., 1992; Raghunnandan, 1993; Weber and Willenborg, 2003).
For example, using initial public offering (IPO) cases, Weber and Willenborg (2003)
find that the pre-IPO opinions of large (small) auditors are more (less) predictive of
post-IPO stock returns and negative stock delisting. In addition to its predictive and
informational values, audit opinion also reflects auditors’ independence from one
angle, but mixed results are obtained from developed and emerging markets
(DeFond et al., 2000b; DeFond et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011). For

17

The results of their primary test support the inference that city-specific industry leaders earn the fee
premium, but they do not hold in all sensitivity tests.
18
At this point, I acknowledge that studies also suggest that the existence of industry specialization
may lead to lower audit fees instead of additional fee premiums due to the shift of cost saving from
auditor to client resulting from the production economy. For example, DeFond et al. (2000a) show
that to capture a higher level of the market share, non-Big 6 audit experts in Hong Kong (HK) charge
their clients with lower fees due to the production economy. However, this is not the case for Big 6
auditors in HK, who are priced with higher fees for the perceived industry specialization. In the U.S.
setting, Fung et al. (2012) further find that clients of specialists do benefit from the city-level
economies of scale. In addition, client bargaining power also plays a role in the process, as both
specialists and non-specialists pass on such benefits to clients with higher bargaining power, whereas
only specialists do so if clients only have low bargaining power.
19
Please see Section 3 of Francis’ (2004) study for a detailed discussion.
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instance, in the U.S. setting, DeFond et al. (2002) find insignificant association
between the propensity to issue going concern audit opinions and audit fees,
consistent with market incentives (i.e. litigation cost and reputation loss), which
outweigh the expected benefits of compromising auditor independence. However,
Chen et al. (2010) find that the propensity to issue modified opinions is associated
with clients’ importance, and that this association is attenuated by improvements to
legal and market institutions in China.

In summary, studies tend to measure auditor quality according to one of the four
dimensions: size, brand name, industry specialization, and audit opinion. Each
dimension captures certain aspects of auditor quality, so to provide a comprehensive
measure and minimize measurement errors, I construct a composite index by
considering all four measures (details of the construction described below).

3.2.2. Auditor Quality and Earnings Management
Studies provide substantive evidence of the effectiveness of quality auditors in
constraining clients’ earnings management activities. For example, Becker et al.
(1998) show that clients of Big 6 auditors are associated with less income-increasing
discretionary accruals than are those of non-Big 6 auditors. Francis et al. (1999) also
find that firms audited by Big 6 auditors have a lower level of discretionary accruals,
although their total accruals are high due to the nature of their business.

In addition to the dichotomous measure of auditor quality, auditor industry
specialization is also used. Krishnan (2003) and Balsam et al. (2003) suggest that
accruals-based earnings management is mitigated by auditors that are industry
specialists, as evidenced by the reported lower level of discretionary accruals’
19

absolute value. In addition, clients of specialist auditors are associated with higher
earnings response coefficients than are those of non-specialists (Balsam et al., 2003).
Gul et al. (2009) document that auditor industry specialization can mitigate the
positive association between short auditor tenure and low earnings quality (proxy by
discretionary accruals). Using both national- and city-level analyses for audit
industry specialization, Reichelt and Wang (2010) examine the issue based on the
framework developed by Ferguson et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2005) and find
that the clients of auditors who are both national and city-specific industry specialists
are associated with the lowest level of abnormal accruals.

Although most studies examine the effect that high quality auditors have on
accruals-based earnings management, a recent study by Chi et al. (2011) focuses on
real earnings management and provides evidence that firms’ contracting with
city-level audit industry experts are associated with greater real earnings
management, such that the association is stronger for firms with incentives to
manage earnings upward than it is for those without such incentives.

3.2.3. Auditor Conservatism
Research provides some evidence of whether auditors exhibit differential reporting
behavior in the direction of managerial incentives for earnings management. St.
Pierre and Anderson (1984) examine auditor-related litigation and find that none of it
is associated with income-decreasing earnings management, which implicitly
suggests that auditors use more rigid conservatism doctrine to reduce the litigation
risk faced in relation to clients’ earnings management activities. Heninger (2001)
further provides empirical evidence that auditor litigation risk increases with the
extent of clients’ income-increasing abnormal accruals, which is consistent with Lys
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and Watts’ (1994) main results noting that auditor litigation is positively associated
with income-increasing total accruals. Kinney and Martin (1994) also document that
the overwhelming audit-related adjustments reduce pre-audit net earnings and net
assets, indicating that firms under investigation are more likely to inflate both.
Similarly, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991, 1993) find that managers are more likely to
overstate than to understate earnings. Based on a questionnaire survey, Nelson et al.
(2002) find that managers tend to make attempts that increase current-year income,
which auditors are more likely to adjust. Hence, auditors’ litigation cost concerns and
clients’ business practices provide the basis for the argument that auditors exhibit
conservatism behavior in performing their audit work.

Previous experiments and empirical studies provide further evidence of whether
auditors exhibit different degrees of skepticism in monitoring directional accrual
manipulations. The results of an experiment conducted by Hirst (1994) suggest that
auditors are sensitive to earnings management activities induced by the monetary
incentives of management, and that they are conservative with earnings manipulation
that is income-increasing orientated. Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that U.S.
auditors are more conservative with high accrual firms and Big 6 auditors exhibit
more conservatism in response to income-increasing than to income-decreasing
accruals. Reichelt and Wang (2010) indicate that auditors who are specialists at both
the national and city levels are more concerned with income-increasing than with
income-decreasing accruals.

As an extension of this line of research, Kim et al. (2003) suggest that “Big 6
auditors have incentives to be more (less) conservative than non-Big 6 auditors in
determining reported earnings when their clients have incentives to overstate
21

(understate) reported earnings through income-increasing (income-decreasing)
accrual choices” (p. 347). The authors attribute their results, potentially, to high
litigation costs and the reputation concerns faced by Big 6 auditors in the event of
audit failure to detect earnings overstatement. In another study, the comparison of
audit quality before and after the demise of Arthur and Anderson due to the Enron
scandal provides further evidence of auditors’ conservatism behavior and litigation
cost concerns (Cohan and Zhang, 2006).

3.2.4. Auditor Quality Research in China
In the past 35 years since China opened its door to the world in 1978, the Chinese
audit market has experienced significant changes. Before 1995, the audit quality in
China’s market was perceived as low due to a low supply of and demand for high
quality audits (DeFond et al., 2000b; Chen et al., 2007). Specifically, listed firms are
majority-owned by the government and managers usually own little shares (Sucher
and Bychkova, 2001), which naturally provides listed firms with little incentive to
demand high quality audits (DeFond et al., 2000b; Klassen, 1997). An immature
corporate governance practice also contributes to the lack of demand for high quality
audits (DeFond et al., 2000b; Liu, 2006) and the problematic IPO quota system
cannot generate incentive to drive such demand, unlike the cases in developed
markets (Aharony et al., 2000; DeFond et al., 2000b). The lack of auditor
independence that results from political and economic affiliations with government
agencies also weakens the likelihood of establishing a high quality audit profession
in China (Chan et al., 2006; DeFond et al., 2000b). Finally, the low litigation cost
environment leads to decreased incentives to supply high quality audits (DeFond et
al., 2000b; Chen et al., 2001; Pitor and Xu, 2005).
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However, the capital market and auditing environment in China have changed since
1995. The Chinese Ministry of Finance (MOF) promulgated its first set of
independent auditing standards in 1995, which was regarded as the turning point in
the development of the Chinese audit market. The MOF and China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) further required that audit firms disaffiliate from
their sponsoring government agencies in 1997, which reduced audit firms’ political
and economic ties with the government. Potential litigation costs generated by audit
failure have become a serious concern for Chinese auditors since 1996 (Chen et al.,
2001; Chen et al., 2010).20 The notorious instances of accounting fraud and scandal
(e.g. ZhengBaiWen, MonkeyKing, Yorkpoint, and YingGuangXia) that occurred in
China in 2000 and 2001 ultimately led to the issuance of a Supreme Court Notice on
January 15, 2002 and the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Rules in
January 200321—both of which were regarded as milestones in the development of
investor protection in the Chinese stock market. Meanwhile, the CSRC abolished its
IPO price controls in July 1999 and abandoned the original IPO quota system in
April 2001 (Li et al., 2008) to begin corporate governance reform such as formally
mandating the practice of hiring independent directors and establishing audit
committees within listed firms (Li et al., 2008). Further, the CSRC began the
share-reform in state-owned listed firms in 2004 (officially completed in 2006). All
of these changes have significantly improved the supply of and demand for
high-quality audits in China since mid-2000.
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On February 15, 1996, the first qualified audit report was issued, followed by the first disclaimer
report by PricewaterhouseCoopers–Dahua in 1997 and the first adverse report by Chongqing CPA in
1997. These events signify that auditors began to be concerned with the litigation risk in China’s
market (Chen et al., 2001).
21
On January 15, 2002, the Supreme Court issued a notice that intermediate courts could accept civil
lawsuits against false statements in the securities market if the CSRC had investigated and sanctioned
the alleged fraud (Chen et al., 2010).
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Previous China audit research has provided some evidence supporting my research
hypotheses. First, large audit firms are known to be more independent than their
smaller counterparts, both in China and in developed markets. For example, DeFond
et al., (2000b) find that large audit firms in China were more likely to issue modified
audit opinions (MAOs) to their clients after adopting the new independent auditing
standards in 1995.22 Second, the independence and quality of Chinese auditors are
valued by stock market investors, as evidenced by the negative market reaction in
response to the issuance of MAOs (Chen et al., 2000). Third, the development and
changes in the Chinese audit market’s laws and regulations around 2000 were
perceived as effective. For example, Chen et al. (2010) find that auditors’ propensity
to issue MAOs is positively associated with the client’s importance from 2001 to
2004, whereas this association is negative in the 1995-2000 period. The authors
attribute their results to the overall institutional improvement in the post-2001 period.
Fourth, unlike the audit markets in developed economies such as those of the U.S.
and Australia, where big N audit firms have very concentrated market shares and
dominant powers, China’s audit market is dispersed, with international big N audit
firms accounting for less than one-third of the market share (Chen et al., 2000; Li et
al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009). As a result, these audit firms compete with their local
counterparts on audit fees in early development periods (Chen et al. 2007), and thus
do not enjoy oligopolistic power in China’s market. Hence, Chinese listed firms do
not face significantly increased audit fees if they make the decision to employ a
prestigious big N auditor.

22

They find that the market share of large audit firms declines following the adoption of new
auditing standards, and they also find that the lost share results mainly from the IPO market. They
describe this phenomenon as a flight from quality. However, a later study by Li et al. (2008) finds that
the market share of large auditors increased in the period between 2001 and 2003, in addition to
consistent evidence that large audit firms are more likely to issue MAOs.
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Chen et al. (2007) and Wang et al. (2009) provide further evidence of auditors’ brand
name and industry specialization effects in China. Specifically, Chen et al. (2007)
show that Big 5 auditors earn a significant fee premium only in their dominated
B-Share market, but not in the competitive A-Share market during the 2000-2003
period. They attribute the significant fee premium earned in the B-Share market to a
lack of competition, such that the dominant power effect outweighs the brand name
effect. However, Wang et al. (2009) find that Big 4 auditors earn fee premiums for
both brand name and industry specialization in both A- and B-Share markets during
the 2005-2006 period. Collectively, the overall results from China audit studies
suggest significant changes and improvements in the perceived audit quality in
China’s market in recent years.

Similar to Kim et al. (2003), I examine whether the effectiveness of high-quality
auditors is differentiated by the divergence or convergence of reporting incentives
between auditors and firms. In contrast, I use tax-rate changes as a setting to identify
directional accruals management. Compared with the income-smoothing setting in
Kim et al. (2003), my setting allows me to identify firms with clearer incentives to
manage earnings downward or upward, thereby reducing potential measurement
errors from sample classification.

3.3. Tax Enforcement
3.3.1. Tax Enforcement Research in the U.S.
Corporate tax avoidance has been the focus of academic research for some time.23
Most of the early studies assume that tax avoidance represents the transfer of wealth
23

For a detailed discussion please see the review paper by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). Consistent
with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), I define tax avoidance as the reduction of explicit taxes, which
includes both activities that are legal and those that fall into the grey area.
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from government to shareholders, with no agency conflicts; that is, that tax
avoidance is costless to shareholders. For example, Graham and Tucker (2006)
compare sample firms involved in tax shelter litigation with clean, matched firms
and find that the former are associated with a lower debt-to-asset ratio than the latter,
arguing that tax shelters are a substitute for interest tax deductions and thus merely
tax-saving devices. In the early 2000s, tax avoidance research began to consider tax
issues within agency frameworks (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009) and proposed
that strong tax enforcement could provide additional monitoring on managerial
diversion that hurts both tax authorities and external shareholders (Desai et al.,
2007).24 Recent empirical studies use the IRS’s enforcement data in the U.S. to
provide direct evidence supporting the tax enforcement argument. For example,
Guedhami and Pittman (2008) find that IRS monitoring lowers the cost of debt
financing for private firms through reducing the information asymmetry in the
borrowing process. Similarly, Ghoul et al. (2011) show that IRS monitoring also
lowers the implied cost of equity financing by reducing agency costs through
restraining managers from diverting income from shareholders. While Guedhami and
Pittman (2008) and Ghoul et al. (2011) provide the support for the theory provided in
Desai et al. (2007) that increased tax enforcement benefits outside shareholders,
Hanlon et al. (2012) complement their studies by documenting the channel through
which tax enforcement affects information asymmetry and cost of capital.
Specifically, they find that IRS audit probability is positively associated with
accruals quality and negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that
24

There are two lines of research under the theoretical framework developed by Desai and
Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et al. (2007), along with three early-stage studies conducted by
Slemrod (2004), Chen and Chu (2005), and Crock and Slemrod (2005). The first line examines the
effect of corporate tax avoidance on firm valuation within an agency framework and examples are
Desai and Dharmapala (2009), Wang (2010), and Simone and Stomberg (2013). The second line
focuses on examining the role of tax enforcement in corporate financial and tax reporting and
examples are Guedhami and Pittman (2008), Ghoul et al. (2011), Hanlon et al. (2012), and Hoopes et
al. (2012). My study focuses on the latter line of research.
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increased tax enforcement has a positive spillover effect on firms’ financial reporting
quality. They also find that the spillover effect of tax enforcement is magnified in
firms with poor corporate governance.

Although tax enforcement has a spillover effect on management rent diversion, it
also has a mitigating effect on tax avoidance. Cross-country level evidence indicates
that the characteristics of a home country’s tax system affect firms’ tax avoidance
activities (Atwood et al., 2012). Empirical support is also obtained from directly
examining the relationship between IRS audit probability and corporate tax
avoidance. For example, Hoopes et al. (2012) find that increased tax enforcement
can effectively limit firms’ tax avoidance (proxy by cash effective tax rate), and that
this limiting effect is particularly strong when firms’ corporate governance is weak.
In addition, Gupta and Lynch (2012) show that state corporate tax enforcement
expenditure is positively associated with state corporate tax collection, providing
additional support for tax enforcement’s direct curtailing effect on tax avoidance.

Previous research proposes and documents the direct curtailing and indirect spillover
effects of tax enforcement, but whether these effects differ for firms with divergence
versus convergence of reporting incentives is an empirical question. Therefore, my
study aims to fill this gap by examining the question under the unique China tax-rate
cut setting.

3.3.2. Tax Enforcement Research in China
Compared with the U.S.-based tax enforcement research, very few studies examine
the role of tax authority scrutiny in China. An exception is Lin et al. (2013), who use
a unique dataset to develop a direct proxy for tax enforcement, providing evidence
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that tax authorities can effectively curtail consolidated groups’ tax-induced
intragroup transfers. Similar to the results from the U.S.-based studies, they also find
that the observed curtailing effect of tax enforcement is stronger (weaker) in listed
firms with poor (superior) corporate governance. In other words, there is a
substitutive relationship between high tax enforcement and corporate governance,
consistent with the results from the U.S.-based studies (e.g. Hanlon et al., 2012).

In summary, although quality auditors exercise different degrees of professional
skepticism in response to clients’ directional accruals manipulation (Hirst, 1994;
Kinney and Martin, 1994; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Kim et al., 2003), more
supporting evidence is still required, particularly from non-U.S. studies. Meanwhile,
as the assumption implicitly made in previous research—that tax authority scrutiny
has a constant effect across economic activities that increase or decrease taxable
incomes—contradicts the notion that tax authorities in different regions have
different amounts of resources and levels of expertise in tax collection (Hanlon et al.,
2012), it is vital that we relax this premise. At this point, the China tax-rate cut event
that provides firms with observable tax incentives to manage earnings downward or
upward offers an opportunity to concurrently examine the effectiveness of auditor
monitoring and tax authority scrutiny on directional accruals manipulation within
one setting. Conducting this test in this setting has both the institutional and
theoretical foundations supported by a number of previous Chinese studies (Chen et
al., 2000; DeFond et al., 2000b; Li et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010;
Lin et al., 2013). Therefore, I develop my hypotheses about the roles that auditors
and tax authorities play in corporate reporting in the following section.
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Chapter 4

Hypotheses Development

Due to the potential for asymmetrically high litigation costs resulting from clients’
income-overstatement activities, auditors are more likely to closely scrutinize
clients’ income-increasing earnings management than to examine income-decreasing
accounting choices (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991;
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1993; Lys and Watts, 1994; Heninger, 2001). Because
higher-quality auditors are regarded as having a higher potential for reputation loss
and deep pockets to handle litigation suits when they occur, they are more likely to
exhibit reporting conservatism than their lower-quality counterparts (DeAngelo,
1981; Dye, 1993; Simunic and Stein, 1996). A number of studies provide support for
this argument by showing a negative association between high-quality auditors and
reported discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Balsam et
al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Zang, 2012). Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that
high-quality auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions for clients with
high income-increasing accruals to reduce the liability exposure that results from
potential future litigation suits. Kim et al. (2003) further examine whether the
effectiveness of high-quality auditors (proxy by Big 6) is differentiated by the
divergence or convergence of reporting incentives between the auditors and their
clients. They find that Big 6 (non-Big 6) auditors are more (less) effective in
constraining accruals manipulation only when their clients have income-increasing
incentives. Similar to Kim et al. (2003), I also examine auditor conservatism by
considering the divergence or convergence of reporting incentives between
high-quality auditors and their clients in a setting where firms have a clear tax
incentive to manage earnings upward or downward.

As introduced and discussed in Chapter 2, the 2008 Enterprise Income Tax Law of
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the People’s Republic of China, which was introduced on March 16, 2007, provided
listed firms with strong tax incentives to manage earnings upward (downward) in
2007 if their corresponding effective tax rates are lower (higher) than the new
statutory corporate income tax rate (i.e. 25%). 25 Hence, the financial reporting
incentives of firms with tax reasons to manage earnings upward in 2007 are
divergent with those of auditors. High-quality auditors are thus likely to be more
skeptical of firms’ income-increasing accruals manipulation. In contrast, firms have
convergent incentives with auditors when they are motivated to make
income-decreasing accruals for tax savings. Thus, in such cases, the expected
constraining effect of high-quality auditors is less likely to be observed.26

When examining the monitoring effect that auditors have on earnings management
under a tax setting, it is necessary to consider the role of tax authorities as important
external monitors in the tax avoidance game. As Desai et al. (2007) suggest, a
potential bilateral agreement may exist between outside shareholders and the state,
and these two parties have similar incentives to monitor insiders27; that is, outside
shareholders have incentives to monitor insiders to avoid potential rent diversion
while, as the largest minority shareholder of the listed firm, the state has significant
25

At this point, it is important to consider the cost generated by the earnings management for tax
saving. U.S.-based studies note that firms’ tax avoidance may trigger the potential scrutiny of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) or the violation of debt
convent (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills, 1998). However, this may not the case for Chinese listed firms,
because territory studies argue a lack of good regulation, protection for investors’ interests, and
sufficient resources for tax administration in China’s capital market, along with the perceived low
potential litigation cost (Lin, 2006; Lin et al., 2012).
26
As noted later this chapter, the initial downward audit effort adjustment (if any) in anticipation of
the close tax scrutiny of accounting choices that reduce taxable income (thus reported earnings) also
contributes to the exhibition of quality auditors’ weak constraining effect on income-decreasing
accruals.
27
Within the framework established by Desai et al. (2007), the tax avoidance game involves three
parties: insiders, outside shareholders, and the state. Hence, three potential bilateral agreements exist:
insider and outside shareholders collude to avoid taxes (Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and Slemrod,
2005); tax authorities monitor insiders for tax avoidance while outside shareholders monitor insiders
for managerial diversion (Guedhami and Pittman, 2008; Ghoul et al., 2011; Hanlon et al., 2012); and
insiders please tax authorities by disguising managerial diversion (Erickson et al., 2004).
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interest in monitoring (via tax authorities’ scrutiny) insiders’ potential tax avoidance
activities. The scrutiny by tax authority of insiders’ economic activities thus has both
a direct curtailing effect on tax avoidance and a spillover effect on deterring potential
rent diversion. Two studies provide direct support for this argument. Hoops et al.
(2012) find that the probability of an IRS audit is negatively associated with firms’
tax avoidance (proxy by cash effective tax rates), which reflects tax enforcement’s
first-order curtailing effect on firms’ aggressive tax positions. In addition, Hanlon et
al. (2012) provide evidence that IRS audit probability is positively associated with
firms’ reporting quality (proxy by either mapping of accruals into cash flows or
discretionary accruals), supporting tax enforcement’s second-order spillover effect
argument.

As tax authorities are empowered through national legislation to collect tax revenues,
they are more concerned with revenue loss. Thus, in contrast to auditors, tax
authorities are likely to exhibit an opposite constraining effect, closely scrutinizing
income-decreasing economic activities while permitting activities that increase
income in the current period. I expect this effect to be more prevalent when tax
authority scrutiny and enforcement are stricter. Intuitively, high regional tax
enforcement is associated with intensified tax collection efforts. Then, ceteris paribus,
the larger the effort, the greater the constraining effect. This is consistent with the
divergence or convergence argument put forward by Kim et al. (2013); that is, when
firms manage upward earnings for tax purposes (e.g. enjoying the tax holiday
position), their incentives are potentially convergent with those of the tax authority.
The convergent incentive, along with increased auditor monitoring, implies that tax
inspectors’ incentives to deter income-increasing accounting choices may diminish.
However, when firms manage downward earnings for tax purposes (e.g. avoiding
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high tax cost due to the high tax rate), their incentives are clearly divergent with
those of the tax authority. Hence, tax authorities’ close monitoring and scrutiny of
firms’ economic activities are expected. In this case, both the direct curtailing effect
and the indirect spillover effect are manifested.

Although Hoopes et al. (2012) find that tax enforcement has a first-order curtailing
effect, they do not suggest the channel through which tax avoidance is constrained.
Meanwhile, although Hanlon et al. (2012) document that tax enforcement has a
positive spillover effect on constraining firms’ reported discretionary accruals, they
do not consider whether the influence is from the divergence or convergence of
reporting preferences between tax authorities and listed firms. Hence, to complement
their studies, I also examine the potential effectiveness differentiation for tax
authorities on constraining tax-induced earnings management.28

As the two independent external monitoring agencies, tax authorities are empowered
to minimize corporate tax avoidances while auditors are primarily responsible for
verifying the truth and fairness of financial reports and thus mitigating the
information asymmetry based on the agency cost theory. Hence, these two parties
have different monitoring interests. However, corporate tax avoidance is usually
conducted in the guise of managing corporate reporting items, and many transactions
have simultaneous influences on taxable income and financial reporting earnings
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). Hence, there is a monitoring overlap of tax
authorities and auditors.
28

My proxy for tax-induced earnings management (DCA) is constructed based on reporting items in
financial statements. To the extent that tax reporting diverges from financial reporting at a basic level
(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Hanlon et al., 2012), the observed
association between tax enforcement and DCA reflects the tax enforcement’s direct curtail and
indirect spillover effects.
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The Chinese tax authorities require firms to submit audited financial statements
along with their annual tax returns. Therefore, the monitoring effort of auditors can
affect the monitoring strength of tax inspectors. The increased auditor monitoring
and the convergence of reporting incentives for income overstatement between
taxpayers and revenue collection agencies may diminish the latter’s incentives to
scrutinize income overstatement activities. Similarly, the increased monitoring
strength of the tax inspector, coupled with the auditors’ low litigation risk associated
with income understatement suggests that auditors will not do more work than
necessary to constrain conservative accounting choices. Therefore, I may observe
that auditor quality is insensitive to income-deceasing reporting incentives, which
are convergent with firm managers. I state my hypotheses as follows.

H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significantly negative association between
high-quality auditors and reported DCA only for firms with incentives to manage
upward earnings.

H1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association between high tax
enforcement and reported DCA only for firms with incentives to manage downward
earnings.
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Chapter 5

Data Sources and Sample Selection

5.1. Data Sources
All of the financial data used to estimate the discretionary current accruals are
obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database.
The data used to construct auditor-related measures are mainly collected from the
CSMAR Database and complemented by manually searching annual financial reports
and audit firms’ websites. The data used to construct tax enforcement measures are
manually collected from the China Tax Audits Yearbook, published annually by the
State Administration of Taxation (SAT). The data for institutional ownership and
listed firms’ applicable tax rates are obtained from the WIND Database. The data
used to calculate the values of all of the other variables are obtained from the
CSMAR Database and are cross-checked with the WIND Database where necessary.

5.2. Sample Selection
As Table 1 shows, I begin with all of the A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2007 and then exclude firms in the financial industry
because they are subject to different regulations. I also exclude firms from the Tibet
Autonomous Region where only state tax is collected. I exclude firms without data
for constructing accruals and auditor-related variables. When I estimate discretionary
current accruals, I exclude firms whose industry groups have fewer than 20
observations in any given year. Firms with unavailable data for constructing the
other control variables are also excluded. The final sample contains 650 firms in
2007.
[Table 1]
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Chapter 6

Research Methodologies

6.1. Model Specification
I develop the following OLS regression to test the two hypotheses:

DCA=a0 + a1QUALITY_HIGH + a2ENFORCEMENT + βControl + ε

where

the

dependent

variable,

DCA,

is

discretionary

current

accruals;

QUALITY_HIGH is high- versus low-quality auditors; and ENFORCEMENT is high
versus low regional tax enforcement. I also include a number of control variables;
each of which is defined in more details as follows.

6.1.1. Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA)
Previous research suggests that discretionary current accruals (DCA) are closely
related to tax-induced earnings manipulation (Hunt et al., 1996; Lopez et al., 1998;
Lin et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2014). Hence, I use DCA to proxy for the tax-induced
accruals-based earnings management. Specifically, I estimate the following
regression model, which is established based on the modified Jones model (Jones,
1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Lopez et al., 1998):

CAi,t/ASSETi,t-1=α1/ASSETi,t-1 + α2 (△SALESi,t-△ARi,t)/ASSETi,t-1 + α3PPEi,t/ASSETi,t-1
+ εi,t

where CAi,t is the current accruals for firm i in year t and is defined as the change in
accounts receivable and inventory minus the change in accounts payable and accrued
expense (Lin et al. 2012; Lin et al., 2014);29 ASSETi,t-1 is the total assets for firm i in
29

Because discretionary current accruals may also result from the unusual, nondiscretionary events
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year t-1; △SALESi,t is the change in total sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t;

△ARi,t is the change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t-1 to year t; PPEi,t is the
total property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t.

I estimate the above regression cross-sectionally for each industry and each year
from 2002 to 2006. To increase the estimation’s accuracy, I require each industry to
have at least 20 observations. I use the estimated parameters (α1, α2, and α3) to derive
the expected firm-specific current accruals in 2007. The 2007 DCA then equals the
prediction error, which is calculated as the difference between the reported and
expected current accruals in 2007, i.e.

DCA2007=Reported [CA/ASSET] 2007 – Expected [CA/ASSET] 2007

6.1.2. Auditor Quality Metrics
AUDIT_QUALITY is a firm-level measure and equals the sum of the following five
indicator variables that cover four aspects of auditor quality. I classify listed firms
with AUDIT_QUALITY above the median value of the sample as having high-quality
auditors (QUALITY_HIGH).

Industry Specialization: Studies suggest that the clients of auditors with industry
specialization have lower levels of earnings management activity (Krishnan, 2003),
higher levels of earnings quality (Balsam et al., 2003), and higher levels of
disclosure quality (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004). Therefore, consistent with previous
such as mergers, acquisitions, and discontinued operations, Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest using
data from the cash flow statement for total accruals estimation. However, due to data limitations, I am
unable to adopt this cash flow method. Given that listed firms in China are less involved in the
abnormal but nondiscretionary activities than public firms in the U.S., the measurement error in my
estimation of discretionary current accruals is potentially less severe.
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studies (Hogan and Jeter, 1999; DeFond et al., 2000a; Gul et al., 2009), I include
AUDIT_SPECIAL, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the listed firm is audited by
an auditor with industry market share (proxy by audit fees earned) ranked first and 0
otherwise,30 to consider the specialization dimension of auditor quality.31

Brand Name: Previous research suggests that big N auditors have a brand name
reputation for providing high-quality audit services (DeFond, 1992; Craswell et al.
1995; DeFond et al., 2000a; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002) and could effectively
constrain their clients’ earnings management activities (Becker et al., 1998; Kim et
al., 2003). Hence, to consider the brand-name dimension of auditor quality, I include
BIG4, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4
audit firms and 0 otherwise.

Auditor Size: Large (small) audit firms provide higher (lower) quality services and
greater (lesser) credibility to financial reports (Nichols and Smith, 1983; Francis and
Wilson, 1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; DeFond, 1992; Balvers et al., 1988; Lennox,
1999), as explained by the reputation hypothesis (DeAngelo, 1981) and the deep
30

Because audit firms provide audit services for both public and private firms, the calculation based
on audit fees earned only from public firms may not accurately measure their real ranking status for
industry specialization. Because the audit fees earned from private firms are unavailable, this problem
could not be well solved. Therefore, to the extent that the fees earned from private firms significantly
affect the rankings on auditor industry specialization, the results reported in this paper are
contaminated.
31
Recent Australian and U.S.-based research further proposes the use of both city- and national-level
proxies for auditor industry specialization (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt and
Wang, 2010). However, this newly developed proxy does not apply to China for two reasons. First,
China audit market studies find that due to the existence of political and economic governmental
influences over the auditing and reporting processes, local auditors decline to report unfavorable
opinions to their clients controlled by local government (local SOE) (Chan et al., 2006). Hence,
regardless of whether the perceived audit industry specialization is high or low, local SOEs are more
likely to hire local audit firms (Chan et al., 2006). Central government-owned SOEs also exhibit this
tendency if they are located in less-developed regions (Wang et al., 2008). Second, unlike the audit
markets in developed economies such as the U.S. and Australia, neither the traditional Big 4 nor the
Big 10 audit firms dominate, and the competition is very fierce in China’s audit market (Chen et al.,
2000; Li et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009). Hence, it is reasonable for me to construct the auditor
industry specialization proxy based on firm/national- instead of city-level data.
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pockets hypothesis (Dye, 1993). I thus include AUDIT_FEES, an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the natural logarithm of audit fees earned from the A-share market is
above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise. To consider the size
dimension of auditor quality from two different angles,

32

I also include

AUDIT_CLIENTELES, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the number of an audit
firm’s clients exceeding the total number of listed firms in the A-share market is
above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise.

Frequency of Issuing Modified Audit Opinions: The propensity to issue modified
audit opinions (MAOs) is another dimension of auditor quality (Craswell et al., 1995;
Chen et al., 2010; Reichelt and Wang, 2010). Previous research shows that
high-quality auditors are more likely to issue MAOs to clients with potential
earnings management activities, due to their litigation cost concerns and perceived
high level of independence (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; DeFond et al., 2000b; Chen
et al., 2010). Therefore, I calculate the ratio of total number of MAO reports issued
to the total number of audit reports issued for each audit firm in each of the previous
two years and set AUDIT_OPINION to equal 1 if the previous two-year average ratio
is above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise.33

6.1.3. Tax Enforcement Metrics
The measure of tax enforcement is developed by Lin et al. (2013), who generate a set
of direct estimates for the perceived regional tax enforcement, based on a factor
32

Recent studies further suggest that the size of city-level Big 4 audit offices is associated with the
audit quality proxy by accrual-based measures (Francis and Yu, 2009; Choi et al., 2010). However,
according to China’s audit market status as discussed in the previous note, it is suitable to apply the
firm- rather than the office-level analysis for 2007.
33
Consistent with previous studies set in China (Chen et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2001; Haw et al., 2003;
Chen et al., 2010), the MAO is defined as all the other types of audit reports except the unqualified
audit opinion report.
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analysis of manually collected data from the China Tax Audits Yearbook.34 Lin et al.
(2013) develop three metrics (PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME) to
measure tax enforcement. PROBABILITY is the number of tax audits conducted (by
offices of the SAT or local tax bureaus in each province or city) over the number of
tax returns filed in the same region; the number of cases prosecuted over the number
of tax returns filed; and the number of permanent employees, tax inspectors, and
audit departments, respectively, over the number of taxpayers. EXPERTISE is the
percentage of inspectors with a bachelor’s degree or higher, and/or with a
professional qualification (accountants, tax agents, and lawyers). OUTCOME is the
dollar amount of tax deficiencies settled and the dollar amount of surcharges,
penalties, and fines, respectively, over the amount of regional tax revenue and the
dollar amount of surcharges, penalties, and fines over the number of tax audits
conducted. Lin et al. (2013) then construct a composite index: ENFORCEMENT,
defined as the average of the sum of the ranks for PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and
OUTCOME for each region (except Tibet) and year. The construct validity of these
metrics is discussed in Lin et al. (2013).

Following Lin et al. (2013), I first develop three separate metrics (PROBABILITY,
EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME) for each region (except Tibet) in each of the five
years from 2003 to 2007 using a factor analysis. For each region in each of the five
years, I then construct a composite index that equals the average of the sum of the
ranks for PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME. Next, I use the ex-post
34

Page 17 of the China Tax Audits Yearbook (Lin et al., 2013), published annually by the State
Administration of Taxation (SAT), contains detailed tax effort information and data: (1) permanent
employees, (2) tax inspectors, (3) employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher and/or with a
professional qualification (certified accountants, tax agents, and lawyers), (4) tax inspectors’ age and
communist party membership, (5) corporate taxpayers, (6) corporate tax return audited, (7) audit
departments, (8) suspicious cases, (9) cases registered, (10) cases prosecuted, (11) regional tax
revenue, (12) tax deficiencies proposed, (13) tax deficiencies settled, (14) overdue tax surcharge, and
(15) tax penalties and fines.
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realized tax enforcement index for 2006 as the ex-ante perceived tax enforcement
index for 2007, because the actual tax enforcement is observed with delay
(Guedhami and Pittman, 2009; Ghoul et al., 2011; Hanlon et al., 2012; and Hoopes et
al., 2012).35 Finally, I set an indicator variable, ENFORCEMENT, to equal 1 if the
average ranking of the sum of the ranks for PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and
OUTCOME is above the country-level median and 0 otherwise, to represent the high
versus low regional tax enforcement in 2007 and assign the value to each sample
firm based on the location of its headquarters.36

6.1.4. Other Control Variables
I include a set of variables to control for cross-sectional variation in firms’ earnings
management based on previous studies. Specifically, I include LAG_INST, the
percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of the year, to control for the
effect of corporate governance on firms’ earnings management activities (Zang,
2012). I include SOE, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is controlled by a
government agency and 0 otherwise, to control for the effect of political connection
on earnings management (Aharony et al., 2000). I include SIZE, the natural
logarithm of total assets, to control for size effect (Becker et al., 1998). I include
TOBIN’S Q, the market value of equity plus the market value of net debts scaled by
total assets, to control for the effect of long-term growth (McNichols, 2000). I

35

However, if listed firms could form rational expectations for tax enforcement in 2007, then the
estimation of an enforcement metric should be based on contemporaneous rather than lag values. Thus,
consistent with Guedhami and Pittman (2009), Ghoul et al. (2011), Hanlon et al. (2012), and Hoopes
et al. (2012), in the robustness test, I re-do the test by using the ENFORCEMENT estimate based on
the ex-post realized tax enforcement index for 2007. The results are generally the same, except that
ENOFRCEMENT becomes marginally and negatively significant for the sub-group of listed firms
with incentives to manage earnings upward.
36
Because the headquarters of a listed firm is central to its business organization and often the focal
point of any enquiry conducted by regulators and tax authorities, the firm is more likely to consider
the regional tax enforcement in which its headquarters resides. Hence, I code the tax enforcement
measure based on the location of the listed firms’ headquarters.
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include LOSS, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firms’ return on equity (ROE)
is negative and 0 otherwise, to control for the effect of delisting regulation on
earnings management (Lin et al., 2012). I include NCF, net operating cash flow
scaled by total sales, to control for its effect on the firms’ accruals manipulation
(Dechow et al., 1995). I include LAG_DCA, lagged discretionary current accrual, to
control for firms’ possible income-smoothing activities in previous years (Lin et al.,
2012). Consistent with previous research, I also include the following five variables
in the regression: ROA, net profit scaled by total assets (Healy and Wahlen, 1999;
Fields et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 2010); LEVERAGE, total liabilities scaled by total
assets (Graham, 1996; Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2001); CAPITAL_INT, net property,
plant, and equipment scaled by total assets (Gupta and Newberry, 1997);
INVENTORY, total inventory scaled by total assets (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2003);
and INTANGIBLE, intangible assets (the sum of intangible assets, goodwill, and
R&D expenditures) scaled by total assets (Hanlon et al., 2007; Shevlin et al., 2012).

6.2. Sample Classification
To examine whether the constraining effects that auditors and tax authorities have on
reported DCA differ regarding the divergence and convergence of incentives, I
identify two groups of firms with different directional reporting incentives. As
explained previously, if firms are confronted with potential tax rate increases
(decreases), then they are likely to manage upward (downward) earnings before the
rate changes. Because long-term effective tax rates are a better proxy for firms’ tax
positions, as they avoid short-term fluctuations resulting from uncertain factors (e.g.
current period’s loss) (Dyreng et al., 2008), I classify the sample into two sub-groups
based on the comparison between the 5-year effective tax rate (5-year ETR) and the

41

new statutory tax rate of 25%.37 Specifically, I classify those firms with 5-year ETR
lower (higher) than 25% as having incentives to manage earnings upward
(downward) and identify them as tax-increase (tax-decrease) firms.38 The 5-year
ETR is calculated as the sum of 5-year total tax expenses less deferred tax expenses
scaled by the sum of 5-year pre-tax income (before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations).

In the sensitivity test, I re-classify the sample based on the comparison of listed firms’ applicable
tax rates in 2007 and 2008. Specifically, I re-classify the sample into two sub-groups: a tax increase
group if the 2007 applicable rate is lower than that of 2008 and a tax decrease group if the 2007
applicable rate is higher than that of 2008. I then re-do the test. The results are qualitatively
unchanged.
38
As introduced in Chapter 2, some of the tax preferences under the new tax law are generally the
same as those applied under the old tax law. Hence, firms that enjoy the same tax preferences both
before and after tax rate reduction may not perceive a change in their tax burden in 2008. If so, then
these firms are misclassified. This is especially true for firms in agriculture and information
technology industries because the tax incentives listed in the old law are very similar to those listed in
the new law. Therefore, as a robustness check, I exclude firms from these two industries and re-do all
the tests. I also exclude those firms from western regions and re-do all the tests. The results are
qualitatively the same. Because the detailed tax preferences data for individual firms are unavailable, I
was unable to fully solve this misclassification problem. To the extent that some of the sample firms
are misclassified as having incentives to manage earnings, the results reported are contaminated.
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Chapter 7

Empirical Results

7.1. Univariate Analysis
Panel B of Table 1 describes the sample by industry.39 As the largest sector of
Chinese economy, the Manufacturing Industry contains 52.3% of firms in the full
sample, followed by the Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry (10.15%) and the Real
Estate Industry (7.85%), whereas the Construction Industry has only 1.69% of the
sample firms. Within the Manufacturing Industry sector, Machinery, the Equipment
and Instrument Industry has 96 sample firms, the largest number among the 7
industry groups within the sector. In contrast, the Electronic Industry only has 22
sample firms in this sector. Across the three sample groups (full sample and
tax-increase and -decrease sub-samples) firms are equally distributed among
Petroleum, Chemical, Plastics and Rubber Products, Utilities, and Transportation
and Warehousing. While Agriculture Industry, Metal and Non-Metal Industry and
Information Technology Industry firms are concentrated in the tax-increase group,
Food and Beverage Industry and Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry firms are
clustered in the tax-decrease group. In summary, most of the firms are evenly
distributed either across industries for each sample group or across the three sample
groups for each industry, suggesting that my results are unlikely to be driven by
industrial differences.

Table 2 reports the mean (median) accruals in 2007. The mean value of current
accruals is negative 1% of the lagged total assets for all firms, which suggests that on
average, listed firms report negative current accruals in 2007—the year immediately

39

Because most of the Chinese listed firms are clustered in the Manufacturing Industry, I adopt the
two-digit CSRC Industry code for this industry and classify the firms engaged in this sector into seven
industry groups. For the other industries, I use the one-digit CSRC Industry code for the industry
group classification.
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before the tax-rate cut. Specifically, the tax-decrease firms make negative accruals to
a greater extent than the tax-increase firms by 1.6% of the lagged total assets (-1.9%
versus -0.3%, t = -1.568, p = 0.117). Except for PPE, the mean (median) values of
the other accrual components are generally smaller for tax-decrease firms than for
their tax-increase counterparts. In particular, the difference in mean (median) values
of scaled △INVENTORY reported by the two groups is significant (t = -2.269, p =
0.024; z = -2.346, p = 0.019), suggesting that most of the between-group differences
in accruals arise from the use of inventory management, i.e. increasing (decreasing)
the inventories held and thus decreasing (increasing) the cost of goods sold. Table 2
also shows the mean (median) DCA for 2007. As expected, while the average DCA is
positive 0.3% of lagged assets for the tax-increase group, it is negative 0.7% for the
counterpart group. Although the difference in mean (median) values of DCA
between the two groups are insignificant, the contrasting results suggest that my
sample partition is effective, which indicates that firms manage different directional
accruals for tax purposes.
[Table 2]

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for audit metrics. As reported in panel A of
Table 3, the mean (median) value of audit firms’ industry market share is only 3.9%
(2.7) for all firms, 4.1% (2.9) for tax-increase firms, and 3.7% (2.6) for tax-decrease
firms—consistent with the notion that the industry market shares of audit firms are
very diverse in China. The low industry market concentration also suggests the need
to use different measures for audit quality in China. The low market share
concentration is also supported by the statistics for CLIENTS_SHARE, one of the
two auditor size measures. For example, the variable has consistently low mean
(median) values across the three sample groups. The statistic for the brand-name
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measure, BIG4, shows that only 3.4% of the sample firms employed Big 4 auditors
in 2007, which is consistent with the fact that the market share of international Big 4
audit firms in China is very low. Interestingly, the mean value of BIG4 is 4.7% for
tax-increase firms, significantly different from the 1.5% for tax-decrease firms (t =
-2.171, p = 0.030). This indicates that the multivariate results for the two groups of
firms may be contaminated by the difference in audit quality metrics across the two
sub-samples if I only use big N for the classification of higher versus lower audit
quality. In terms of raw value for FEES, another measure of auditor size, auditors
earn RMB30 million from tax-increase firms on average, which is significantly
different from the RMB21 million earned from tax-decrease firms (t = -2.057, p =
0.040), providing further support for the use of different dimensions to measure audit
quality. The mean value of MAO_PERCENTAGE suggests that on average, 11% of
the sample firms received audit reports with MAOs in 2005 and 2006. However, the
mean (median) value of MAO_PERCENTAGE is 0.113 (0.102) for tax-increase firms,
which is 0.008 (0.004) points higher than that for tax-decrease firms. Consistent with
the auditor conservatism argument, this statistic shows that auditors issue more
MAOs to firms in China with incentives to manage upward earnings than to those
with incentives to manage downward earnings.

Panel B of Table 3 reports the mean (median) values of AUDIT_QUALITY and
QUALITY_HIGH. Specifically, the mean (median) value of AUDIT_QUALITY for
the tax-increase firms is 1.594 (2.000), which is comparable to the value of 1.508
(2.000) for all firms but significantly higher—0.214 (1.000) points—than for the
tax-decrease group (t = -2.572, p = 0.010; z = -2.444, p = 0.015). This indicates that
on average, higher-quality auditors are more likely to be employed by firms in the
tax-increase rather than –decrease group. The mean value of QUALITY_HIGH for
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tax-increase firms (0.220) is significantly higher (0.075 points) than that for
tax-decrease firms (t = -2.408, p = 0.016; z = -2.399, p = 0.016), which may suggest
that the former are more likely than the latter to employ high-quality auditors to
increase the credibility of their financial reports.
[Table 3]

Panel A of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the twelve variables used in
factor analysis for tax enforcement. There is substantial variation among most of the
variables used across different regions and years. For example, the mean value of
Ratio 2 (the number of cases prosecuted over the number of tax returns filed) is
about 1.6% for the 2003-2007 period, with Shannxi having the highest rate (7.7%)
and Inner Mongolia (untabulated) having the lowest (1%). During the study period,
about 4.6% of inspectors are certified tax agents (Ratio 8), but only 1% is certified
public accountants (Ratio 7). Across the regions, untabulated statistics show that
Anhui and Jiangsu have the highest percentages of inspectors who are certified tax
agents (15.3%) and those who are certified public accountants (3.1%), respectively.
Within the 5-year estimation period, the dollar amount of tax deficiencies settled and
that of surcharges, penalties, and fines imposed are, on average, 1.8% and 0.2% of
the regional tax revenue, respectively.

I use principal component analysis to extract factors of interest that represent
common variance in these twelve variables. Specifically, I retain factors with
eigenvalues above one. As Panel B of Table 4 reports, applying this criteria results in
the retention of three factors that together explain 65.8% of the total variance in the
original data. To maximize the variance of the squared loadings of each of the three
retained factors on all of the variables in the corresponding factor matrix, I rotate the
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three factors orthogonally and then determine whether there is a statistical and
substantive association between each factor and other variables. I associate each
factor with those variables that have a loading in excess of 0.60 in absolute value,
and are statistically different from zero at conventional levels. As the panel reveals,
factor 1 is associated with Ratio1 (factor loading = 0.697), Ratio2 (factor loading =
0.810), Ratio3 (factor loading = 0.738), Ratio4 (factor loading = 0.879), and Ratio5
(factor loading = 0.746)—all of which are related to the propensity to conduct and
enforce tax audits. I thus define factor 1 as the probability of taxpayers being audited
and prosecuted by tax authorities for the region (PROBABILITY). Factor 2 is
associated with Ratio 7 (factor loading = 0.872), Ratio 8 (factor loading = 0.827),
and Ratio 9 (factor loading = 0.716). Because these three variables mainly describe
the tax inspectors’ expertise, I define factor 2 as the sufficiency and expertise of tax
inspectors and audit agents for the region (EXPERTISE). Factor 3 is associated with
Ratio 10 (factor loading = 0.984) and Ratio 11 (factor loading = 0.984). Because
these two variables report tax inspection results, I define factor 3 as the audit
outcomes or consequences including tax deficiency settlements, overdue payment
surcharges, and penalties and fines (OUTCOME). Based on these three variables
(PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME), I construct a composite
enforcement index that equals the average ranking of the sum of the ranks for the
three variables for each region (except Tibet) and year, and set ENFORCEMENT to
equal 1 if the value of the enforcement index is above the country-level median and
0 otherwise. This represents the high versus low regional tax enforcement. Finally, I
code each sample firm based on the location of its headquarters and assign it the
corresponding ENFORCEMENT value.

Panel C of Table 4 reports the mean (median) values of tax enforcement variables.
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Compared with their counterparts, tax decrease firms have higher mean (median)
values for all the four variables, suggesting that these firms are located in areas with
high level of regional tax enforcement. However, except for OUTCOME, the
difference in mean (median) values of all the other enforcement metrics
(PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and ENFORCEMENT) between the two sub-groups is
statistically insignificant. Hence, my expected association between ENFORCEMENT
and reported DCA is hardly to be driven by difference in tax enforcement measure.
[Table 4]

Table 5 reports the mean (median) values of ETR5 and the control variables for all of
the firms—tax-increase and -decrease. As presented, listed firms in my sample, on
average, report 22.9% of 5-year long-term effective tax rates, which indicates that a
large amount of tax incentives is granted by the government. Specifically,
tax-increase firms report significantly lower mean and median values of ETR5 than
their counterparts (11.4% versus 39.8%, t=26.354; 13.7% versus 33.3%, z=21.609).
This comparing result is consistent with domestic listed firms have different
directional tax incentives in the year immediately prior to the tax-rate cut. For the
control variables, on average, tax-increase firms have a higher percentage of
government ownership (SOE) than tax-decrease firms (0.718 versus 0.665, t =
-1.442). Relative to their counterparts, tax-increase firms report a mean (median)
ROA that is 0.006 (0.008) points higher—possibly the direct result of these firms
having managed their earnings upward before the tax rate increase. Tax-increase
firms have higher mean but lower median values of SIZE and lower mean but higher
median values of INVENTORY than their tax-decrease counterparts, although each of
the two sub-samples’ mean (median) values of SIZE and of INVENTORY are
comparable to those of the full sample. For the other control variables, tax-decrease
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firms generally have higher (though insignificant) mean and median values than their
counterparts. For example, the mean and median values of LEVERAGE are 0.525
(0.509) and 0.559 (0.519) for tax-decrease (tax-increase) firms, respectively.
Likewise, the mean (median) value of NCF is 0.029 (0.012) points higher for
tax-decrease (tax-increase) firms. Overall, the statistics on the control variables
reported in Table 5 are comparable across the three groups of firms, indicating that
the expected association between the two external monitors (auditors and tax
authorities) and reported DCA is not likely to be driven by the differences in
firm-level characteristics.
[Table 5]

7.2. Multivariate Tests
Table 6 presents the regression results for the OLS estimation. As reported, the
coefficient on QUALITY_HIGH is significantly negative for the full sample (-0.015
with t = -1.65). The result shows that on average, clients of higher- (lower-) quality
auditors report DCAs that are significantly lower (higher) by an average of 1.5% of
lagged assets. These results are consistent with those of previous studies (e.g. Becker
et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2003) in that higher-quality auditors constrain more
income-increasing accruals manipulation than their lower-quality counterparts. The
coefficient on ENFORCEMENT is positive but insignificant, possibly due to the
offsetting effects of directional accruals management.

The second and third columns of Table 6, respectively, report the empirical results of
testing for whether the effectiveness of auditor monitoring and tax authority scrutiny
on reported DCA differs for firms with incentives to manage earnings upward
(tax-increase group) and downward (tax-decrease group) for tax purposes. As
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expected, the coefficient on QUALITY_HIGH is negative and significant for
tax-increase firms (-0.020 with t = -2.03), consistent with my hypothesis that higher(lower-) quality auditors are more (less) effective in constraining reported DCA
when firms have incentives to manage upward earnings for tax purposes. However,
the coefficient on QUALITY_HIGH is negative but insignificant for tax-decrease
firms (-0.008 with t = -0.42), suggesting that there is no difference in the
effectiveness of higher- versus lower-quality auditors on reported DCA for firms
with incentives to manage downward earnings for tax purposes.

Regarding the effectiveness of tax authority scrutiny, the results in column 3 of
Table 6 show that the coefficient on ENFORCEMENT is significantly positive for
tax-decrease firms (0.026 with t = 2.08).40 This means that firms subject to stricter
tax enforcement (on average) report 2.6% higher DCA than their counterparts when
they have incentives to manage earnings downward for current tax savings. However,
the coefficient on ENFORCEMENT is negative but insignificant for tax-increase
firms (-0.006 with t = -0.75), suggesting that tax enforcement plays a greater role in
restraining managers from engaging in discretionary accounting methods and
choices that would lead to a reduction in tax revenues.

For control variables, the coefficient of SOE is significantly negative for the
tax-decrease firms (-0.025 with t = -2.01), suggesting that SOEs are more likely to
make income-decreasing accruals than their counterparts as a way of benefitting
40

After replacing the ENFORCEMENT by each of the three tax enforcement factors (i.e.,
PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME), I further explored which dimension of tax
enforcement plays the most effective monitoring role. However, untabulated results show that none of
these separate variables are statistically significant in the predicted directions across the sample
groups. It is thus possible that only an overall balanced strengthen on those three tax enforcement
dimensions could effectively constrain firms’ potential tax avoidance activities via directional
accruals management.
50

from the tax rate reduction. This is consistent with the argument that firms with large
government ownership are likely to exploit political connections to lower their tax
burden, as state ownership represents a strong form of political connection and
politically connected firms tend to receive preferential treatment from the
government and are also subject to less tax scrutiny (Faccio et al., 2006). The
coefficient of SIZE is positive and significant for tax-increase firms while
LEVERAGE is negative and significant for the full sample, indicating that large firms
are associated with more reported DCA while highly leveraged firms are correlated
with less reported DCA. Although DCA is negatively associated with NCF (high
operating cash flow firms have low discretionary current accruals), it is positively
associated with INVENTORY (inventory-intensive firms have more DCA).

In summary, Table 6 provides evidence that the constraining effects of auditors and
tax authorities on reported DCA differs for firms with incentives to manage
downward versus upward earnings for tax purposes. Specifically, the monitoring of
higher-quality auditors is more effective when their clients have strong incentives to
manage earnings upward. Meanwhile, the monitoring of tax authorities is stricter
when taxpayers have incentives to make income-decreasing accruals that lower tax
payment. Taken together, the results in Table 6 suggest that the monitoring of one
party can have a spillover effect on the monitoring of the other. Specifically, tax
authorities’ intensified scrutiny of transactions that decrease the current tax payment
may compensate for auditors’ lack of monitoring on income-decreasing accounting
choices. Meanwhile, revenue agencies can also benefit from auditors’ increased
monitoring of income-increasing accruals that may lead to tax revenue loss in the
future.
[Table 6]
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7.3. Additional Discussion
Although I argue that the observed insignificant association between quality auditors
(tax authorities) and reported DCA for firms with incentives to manage earnings
downward (upward) is due to their lack of constraining incentives, it may also be due
to their workload adjustment in response to changes in the other parties’ monitoring.
As financial statement (book) and taxable incomes are based on the same underlying
economic transactions, there are some overlaps in corporate reporting that both
monitoring parties watch, creating a necessary condition for the spillover effect to
exist; that is, when the auditor increases monitoring on book income, the tax
authority may decrease monitoring on taxable income. Similarly, when the tax
authority strengthens monitoring on taxable income, the auditor may permit himself
to decrease monitoring on book income. Therefore, it is unclear which effect
(constraining or spillover) plays the dominant role in explaining the results. However,
as non-overlaps in corporate reporting (i.e. reporting higher or lower book income
with no corresponding effect on tax income, or vice versa) do not prompt the
spillover effect, it is probable that the observed insignificant association between the
variables of interest in each of the two distinct situations is due to the constraining
effect.

I have not explained whether the association between quality auditors and reported
DCA are subject to influences from auditor-provided non-audit tax services.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011) find that auditor-provided tax services mitigate
earnings management activities due to the knowledge spillover effect. Specifically, if
auditors provide both audit and tax services to the same client, then the insights
learned from providing tax services will benefit their work in auditing the same
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client’s financial statements, thereby improving the audit quality. However, evidence
from McGuire et al. (2012) suggests that the clients of auditors with industry
specialization are associated with greater tax avoidance. Hence, the effect of
auditor-provided non-audit tax services on tax-induced corporate accruals
manipulation remains inconclusive. Due to the non-disclosure of fees data for
auditor-provided non-audit tax services in China, I am unable to explore this issue
further to determine whether the effect of non-audit services biases for or against my
results.
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Chapter 8

Sensitivity Tests

8.1. Using Lagged ROA in the Estimation of DCA
Previous research suggests that as future accruals are predicted by firms’ past
performance, the performance-related predictable component of accruals must be
filtered out to avoid the spurious indication of discretionary accruals (Kothari et al.,
2005). Hence, as a robustness test, I re-estimate the DCA by including lagged ROA
in the regression model (Kothari et al., 2005). Table 7 reports the results of the
sensitivity tests (results on control variables are not tabulated for simplicity). As
panel A of Table 7 shows, the results are qualitatively the same. Specifically, the
coefficient of QUALITY_HIGH is negative and marginally significant for the full
sample (-0.015 with t = -1.69), becoming significantly negative for tax-increase
firms (-0.020 with t = -2.06) and insignificant for tax-decrease firms (-0.008 wit t =
-0.40). In addition, the coefficient of ENFORCEMENT is only significantly positive
for tax-decrease firms (0.027 with t = 2.14). Therefore, my results are not subject to
the influence of past firm performance on the estimation of DCA.

8.2. Relaxing the Assumption of Using Ex-Post Realized Tax Enforcement
In the main test, I use ex-post realized ENFORCEMENT in 2006 as ex-ante
perceived ENFORCEMENT in 2007, because enforcement is likely to have delayed
effects. However, if firm managers formed rational expectations on tax enforcement
for 2007, then the perceived ENFORCEMENT for 2007 should be based on
contemporaneous value. Thus, as a robustness check, I re-do the test by measuring
ENFORCEMENT contemporaneously. The results presented in panel B of Table 7
are generally the same as those reported in Table 6, except that ENOFRCEMENT
becomes marginally significant for tax-increase firms (-0.016 with t = -1.84). As the
new enterprise income tax law provides firms with strong incentives to manage
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earnings for tax purposes, tax authorities are more likely to strictly scrutinize firms’
economic activities in anticipation of potential tax avoidance triggered by the new
tax law. If firm managers can form rational expectations on the increased likelihood
of tax authority scrutiny, then they are less likely to manage earnings for tax
purposes, regardless of the direction of their earnings management incentives.

8.3. Additional Issues in Tax Enforcement Metric
First, previous studies find that listed firm may endogenously determine to register in
a specific location for tax reason (e.g., Wu et al., 2007). However, in China, whether
a firm could be listed in an exchange is, in some extent, politically determined and
the operating of a listed firm is important for its register place’s development of
economy and social welfare (Aharony et al., 2000a). Hence, it is hard for a listed
firm to re-register or move to a new location with low perceived regional tax
enforcement for tax reason. Second, in this study, I use the province-level tax
enforcement measure conduct the test. It is possible that some province-level omitted
variables that are correlated with both ENFORCEMENT and DCA might account for
my main test results. Hence, consistent with previous research (Wang et al, 2008; Lo
et al., 2010), I include the NERI index developed by Fan et al. (2007) and re-do the
test as a robustness check. As reported in panel C of Table 7, the results are
qualitatively the same as those presented in Table 6.

8.4. Endogenous Issue in Auditor Selection
Previous research suggests that firms with higher total accruals are more likely to
hire higher-quality auditors to signify the credibility of their financial reporting
(Francis et al., 1999). In addition, previous Chinese studies find that local SOE firms
are more likely to hire local audit firms to obtain favorable audit reports (Chan et al.,
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2006; Wang et al. 2008). Hence, the decision to employ higher-quality auditors may
be endogenously determined which, if true, affects the validity of my results.
However, because I measure auditor quality based on five variables rather than a
choice variable, and because the values for three of the five variables
(AUDIT_CLIENTELES, AUDIT_FEES, and AUDIT_OPINION) are determined
based on the variables’ median values of the sample, the classification of higherversus lower-quality auditors is unobservable for each individual firm in the sample.
In addition, as the tax-rate-cut event is a one-time sudden shock, firms are unlikely to
employ a new auditor just for the one-time manipulation. Therefore, firms with large
amounts of accruals are unlikely to self-select themselves into higher-quality
auditors, which are measured based on five variables from four dimensions.

8.5. Different Sample Classification
In the main test, I classify sample firms into tax-increase and -decrease groups by
comparing their 5-year long-term effective tax rates to the 25% income tax rate. As
an alternative check, I re-classify the sample by comparing listed firms’ applicable
corporate income tax rates in 2007 and 2008. Specifically, I define firms as having
incentives to manage earnings upward (i.e. the tax-increase firms) if their applicable
income tax rates were higher in 2008 than in 2007. Similarly, firms are defined as
having incentives to manage earnings downward (i.e. the tax-decrease firms) if they
anticipated a reduction in their applicable income tax rate in 2008. I exclude 6 firms
that did not experience a change in their applicable tax rates. The alternative results
are presented in panel D of Table 7. The coefficient on QUALITY_HIGH is
significantly negative for the full sample (-0.016 with t = -1.78) and the tax rate
increase sample (-0.023 with t = -1.67), and the coefficient on ENFORCEMENT is
significantly positive only for the tax-decrease group (0.020 with t = 2.17). These
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results are consistent with my main results. As a further check, I also re-classify
firms with 5-year long-term effective tax rates below (above) their 2008-year’s
effective tax rates as tax-increase (tax-decrease) firms. Two firms are excluded
because of no change in their effective tax rates. Based on this new partition, I re-do
the test. Again, as reported in panel E of Table 7, the results are qualitatively
unchanged, suggesting that the effectiveness of auditor monitoring and tax authority
scrutiny on DCA differs for firms with incentives to manage earnings upward or
downward for tax purposes.

8.6. Firms Enjoying Similar Tax Preference across Years
As mentioned, some firms may enjoy similar tax preferences under both the old and
the new enterprise income tax laws. This is especially the case for firms engaging in
the Agricultural and Information Technology industries. As a robustness check, I
exclude 42 firms that belong to these two industries from the sample and re-do the
tests. Panel F of Table 7 presents the regression results. Although the reduced sample
causes the coefficient on QUALITY_HIGH to be insignificant for the full sample, it
does not alter the overall theme that, due to a different focus, quality auditors are
more concerned with income-increasing accruals while revenue authorities are more
alarmed by income-decreasing accruals that can lead to tax revenue losses. I also
drop 94 firms located in western regions (Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Yunnan, Sichuan,
Shannxi, Guizhou, Chongqing, Xinjiang, and Xizang), because these firms may have
enjoyed the same tax preferences in both 2007 and 2008. The results reported in
panel G of Table 7 are qualitatively similar to those reported in panel F of the same
table.
[Table 7]
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Chapter 9

Conclusion

China’s new enterprise income tax law reduced the corporate income tax rate to 25%
from 33% and terminated most of the tax preferences established under the old law.
The tax rate change provides firms with observable incentives to manage earnings
downward or upward for tax purposes, allowing me to identify two distinct situations
through which to concurrently study the effects of auditor monitoring and tax
authority scrutiny on directional earnings management. Due to their different
interests, auditors and taxing authorities are very cautious about accounting choices
that increase and decrease reported earnings. I hypothesize and find that while
higher-quality auditors constrain income-increasing accruals to a greater extent than
lower-quality auditors, tougher tax enforcement mitigates income-decreasing
accruals to a larger degree than does looser tax enforcement. However, due to fewer
concerns and possible initial work effort adjustments, I do not find evidence that
auditors (tax authorities) exhibit the same behavior when their clients (taxpayers)
have tax incentives to manage earnings downward (upward). Collectively, my results
suggest that there is a spillover effect of one monitor over the other in limiting
corporate directional accruals management.

My study complements that of Kim et al. (2003) by providing emerging market
evidence regarding the effectiveness differentiation of quality auditors’ monitoring
from tax perspective. After relaxing the implicit assumption that the extent of tax
authority scrutiny is constant across directional accruals, my study also extends those
of Desai et al. (2007), Hoopes et al. (2012), and Hanlon et al. (2012) by considering
the divergence or convergence of preferences between tax authorities and listed
firms for directional earnings management. Because tax authorities are concerned
with accounting choices that lower taxable income, they are more likely to
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strengthen (weaken) their scrutiny of the economic activities of firms with incentives
to manage earnings downward (upward). Further, my study complements the
literature by documenting a spillover effect between the two external monitors of the
firms (auditors and tax authorities) on directional accruals management for tax
purposes. My findings have implications for tax authorities, audit professionals, and
capital market investors. Specifically, auditors’ lack of attention on corporate
income-decreasing activities could be compensated by increased tax authority
scrutiny on these activities that lower tax payment. Similarly, tax inspectors can also
benefit from auditors’ increased monitoring of aggressive earnings management
behavior that may result in net tax revenue losses over time. Finally, capital market
investors could benefit from an increase in the credibility of corporate financial
reporting because they can expect each of the two directions in earnings management
to be mitigated by at least one external monitor.
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Chapter 10

Limitations and Future Research

My study has the following limitations. First, I calculate the discretionary current
accruals from the regression estimates. The validity of my results is thus subject to
measurement errors, as is the case in many earnings management studies. Second,
my tests are based on post-audit financial data that may potentially understate the
effectiveness of auditors in constraining corporate earnings management activities,
because some of the accrual manipulations would have been detected and prevented
by the auditors. Third, due to the unavailability of detailed firm-level tax preferences
data I was unable to fully rule out the possibility of misclassification in the directions
of firms’ earnings management incentives. Because I construct the audit quality
index by allocating equal weight to each of the five components, future studies
should re-investigate the issue when a better proxy for audit quality can be
developed. In addition, future researchers should investigate firms’ operating
performance and capital market reactions, conditional on the existence of
tax-induced earnings management and high tax enforcement. Finally, although
auditor-provided non-audit tax services are argued to influence audit services to the
same client, I do not incorporate this issue into the test, mainly due to the lack of
data disclosure in China. I leave this area for future research when the necessary data
are available.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
DCA

= discretionary current accruals for 2007 estimated
cross-sectionally for each industry and each year from
2002 to 2006.

ENFORCEMENT

= tax enforcement, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
average ranking of the sum of the ranks for
PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME is above
the country level median and 0 otherwise.
= the probability of taxpayers being audited and
prosecuted by tax authorities for the region (factor 1).
= the sufficiency and expertise of tax inspectors and audit
agents for the region (factor 2).
= the audit outcomes or consequences (including tax
deficiencies settled and overdue payment surcharges,
penalties, and fines) for the region (factor 3).

PROBABILITY
EXPERTISE
OUTCOME

AUDIT_QUALITY
QUALITY_HIGH
AUDIT_SPECIAL
BIG4
AUDIT_CLIENTELES

AUDIT_ FEES

AUDIT_OPINION

ETR5

ETR5_D

SOE
ROA
SIZE
LEVERAGE
TOBIN’S Q

= AUDIT_SPECIAL+ BIG4+ AUDIT_ CLIENTELES+
AUDIT_ FEES+ AUDIT_OPINION
= indicator variable that equals 1 if AUDIT_QUALITY is
above the median value of sample and 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if auditor’s industry
market share ranked first and 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if listed firm is audited by
one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if the number of the audit
firm’s clients over the total number of listed firms is
above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if the natural log of total
audit fees earned are above the median value of the
sample and 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if the previous 2-year
average ratio of the number of modified audit opinion
(MAO) reports to total reports issued is above the
median value of the sample and 0 otherwise.
= 5-year long-run effective tax rates, calculated as the sum
of 5-year total tax expenses less deferred tax expenses
scaled by the sum of 5-year pre-tax income (before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations).
= indicator variable that equals 1 if 5-year long-run ETR is
less than 25% and 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if listed firm is controlled
by a government agency and 0 otherwise.
= net profit scaled by total assets.
= natural log of total assets.
= total liabilities scaled by total assets.
= the market value of equity plus market value of net debts
61

scaled by total assets.
LOSS
NCF
CAPITAL_INT
INVENTORY
INTANGIBLE
LAG_DCA

= indicator variable that equals 1 if the return on equity
(ROE) is negative and 0 otherwise.
= net operating cash flow scaled by total sales.
= net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets.
= total inventory scaled by total assets.
= intangibles assets (the sum of intangible assets, goodwill,
and R&D) scaled by total assets.
= previous year’s discretionary current accrual.
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Table 1 Firms in the Sample (2007)
Panel A: Sample selection
Initial non-financial firms from CSMAR database
Less: Firms being delisted
Less: Firms from Tibet
Less: Firms without required financial information
Less: Firms without audit information

1,453
71
8
522
202

Final sample

650

Panel B: Sample distribution by industry

Agriculture
Mining
Food and Beverage
Textile, Apparel, Fur and Leather
Petroleum, Chemical, Plastics,
and Rubber Products
Electronics
Metal, Non-Metal
Machinery, Equipment and
Instrument
Medicine and Biological Products
Utilities
Construction
Transportation and Warehousing
Information Technology
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Real Estate
Social Services
Conglomerates
Total

Tax-Increase
firms
N
%
11
2.84
4
1.03
10
2.58
19
4.91
37
9.56

Tax-Decrease
firms
N
%
2
0.76
6
2.28
17
6.46
6
2.28
26
9.89

All
N
13
10
27
25
63

%
2.00
1.54
4.15
3.85
9.69

22

3.38

16

4.13

6

2.28

64
96

43
70

11.11
18.09

21
26

7.98
9.89

43
36
11
33
29
66

9.85
14.7
7
6.62
5.54
1.69
5.08
4.46
10.1

23
22
8
19
26
22

5.94
5.68
2.07
4.91
6.72
5.68

20
14
3
14
3
44

7.60
5.32
1.14
5.32
1.14
16.73

51
28
33

5
7.85
4.31
5.08

26
15
16

6.72
3.88
4.13

25
13
17

9.51
4.94
6.46

650

100

387

100

263

100
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Table 2 Mean (Median) Discretionary Current Accruals for Tax-Increase versus Tax-Decrease firms
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
firms
firms
Difference
t-value
z-stat.
Current Accrual/Assets
-0.010 (-0.007)
-0.003 (-0.004)
-0.019 (-0.011)
-0.016 (-0.006)
-1.568 (-1.350
Natural Log of Assets
21.531 (21.485)
21.536 (21.450)
21.525 (21.543)
-0.011 (0.093)
-0.154 (0.439)
)
-0.001 (-0.003)
0.000 (0.000)
-0.003 (-0.009)
-0.003 -0.009
-0.337 (-1.188
△Accounts
0.037 (0.011)
0.046 (0.013)
0.024 (0.008)
-0.022** (-0.005)**
-2.269 (-2.346
△
Inventory/Assets
Receivable/Assets
)
0.018 (0.007)
0.019 (0.009)
0.017 (0.004)
-0.003 (-0.004)
-0.406 (-1.059
△Accounts Payable/Assets
)
0.026 (0.013)
0.027 (0.013 )
0.023 (0.012)
-0.004 (-0.001)
-0.675 (-0.968
△Accrued Expense/Assets
)
PPE
0.328 (0.281)
0.326 (0.277)
0.332 (0.287)
0.006 (0.010)
0.340 (0.280)
)
DCA/Assets
-0.001 (-0.002)
0.003 (0.000)
-0.007 (-0.006)
-0.010 (-0.006)
-1.284 (-1.039
LAG_DCA/Assets
0.005 (0.002)
0.004 (0.001)
0.007 (0.002)
0.003 (0.001)
0.483 (0.266)
)
Sample Size
650
387
263
Model Specification
CAi,t/ASSETi,t-1 = α1/ASSETi,t-1+α2(△SALESi,t-△ARi,t)/ASSETi,t-1+α3PPEi,t/ASSETi,t-1+εi,t
where
CAi,t = current accruals for firm i in year t, defined as the change in accounts receivable
plus inventory minus the change in accounts payable plus accrued expense
ASSETi,t-1 = the total asset for firm i in year t-1;

△SALESi,t = the change in total sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t;
△ARi,t = the change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t;
PPEi,t = the property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t;
** represents significance at the 5% level
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics on Auditor Quality Metrics
Panel A: Mean (median) values of auditor quality metrics for tax-increase and tax-decrease firms
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
firms
firms
Difference
INDUSTRY_SHARE
0.039 (0.027)
0.041 (0.029)
0.037 (0.026)
-0.004 (-0.003)
BIG4
0.034 (0.000)
0.047 (0.000)
0.015 (0.000)
-0.031** (0.000)**
CLIENTS_SHARE
0.024 (0.022)
0.025 (0.023)
0.024 (0.022)
-0.001 (-0.002)
FEES
16.418 (16.372) 16.481 (16.372) 16.326 (16.196) -0.155** (-0.176)
MAO_PERCENTAGE
0.110 (0.102)
0.113 (0.102)
0.105 (0.098)
-0.008 (-0.004)
Sample Size
650
387
263

t-value
-1.178
-2.171
-0.566
-2.057
-1.497

z-stat.
(-0.635)
(-2.164)
(-0.833)
(-1.452)
(-1.267)

Variables Definitions
INDUSTRY_SHARE
BIG4
CLIENTS_SHARE
FEES
MAO_PERCENTAGE

=
=
=
=
=

the ratio of audit fees earned in an industry to the total audit fees earned by all auditors in the same industry;
indicator variable that equals 1 if the listed firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise;
the number of the audit firm’s clients over the total number of listed firms in the market;
the natural log of the auditor’s total audit fees earned in the market;
the previous two-year average ratio of the number of modified audit opinion (MAO) reports to total reports
issued.

** represents significance at the 5% level
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Table 3 (Continued)
Panel B: Construction of AUDIT_QUALITY

AUDIT_QUALITY
QUALITY_HIGH
Sample Size

All
1.508 (2.000)
0.189 (0.000)
650

Tax-Increase
firms
1.594 (2.000)
0.220 (0.000)
387

Tax-Decrease
firms
1.380 (1.000)
0.144 (0.000)
263

Difference
-0.214** (-1.000)**
-0.075** (0.000)**

t-value
z-stat.
-2.572 (-2.444)
-2.408 (-2.399)

Construction of AUDIT_QUALITY
AUDIT_QUALITY = AUDIT_SPECIAL+ BIG4+ AUDIT_ CLIENTELES+ AUDIT_ FEES+ AUDIT_OPINION
where
AUDIT_SPECIAL = 1 if INDUSTRY_SHARE is ranked first in the industry and 0 otherwise;
BIG4
AUDIT_ CLIENTELES
AUDIT_ FEES
AUDIT_OPINION
therefore
QUALITY_HIGH

=
=
=
=

1 if listed firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise (the same as above);
1 if CLIENTS_SHARE is above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise;
1 if FEES is above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise;
1 if MAO_PERCENTAGE is above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise;

=

1 if AUDIT_QUALITY is above the median value of the sample and 0 otherwise.

** represents significance at the 5% level
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Table 4 Factor Analysis for Tax Enforcement
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for variables used in factor analysis
Variable Mean
Min
Q1
Median Q3
Max
SD

N

Ratio1

0.038

0.002

0.013

0.025

0.048

0.228

0.039

300

Ratio2

0.016

0.001

0.006

0.012

0.021

0.077

0.015

300

Ratio3

0.029

0.009

0.018

0.027

0.035

0.072

0.014

300

Ratio4

0.004

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.005

0.014

0.002

300

Ratio5

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.000

300

Ratio6

0.894

0.742

0.860

0.905

0.937

0.984

0.058

300

Ratio7

0.010

0.000

0.003

0.008

0.014

0.031

0.008

300

Ratio8

0.046

0.007

0.026

0.038

0.060

0.153

0.030

300

Ratio9

0.004

0.000

0.001

0.003

0.005

0.034

0.006

300

Ratio10

0.018

0.002

0.009

0.015

0.024

0.057

0.012

300

Ratio11

0.002

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.011

0.002

300

Ratio12

0.943

0.047

0.322

0.649

1.214

4.370

0.930

300

Variable definitions
Ratio 1
= the number of tax audits conducted over the number of tax returns
filed.
Ratio 2
= the number of cases prosecuted over the number of tax returns filed.
Ratio 3
= the number of permanent employees over the number of taxpayers.
Ratio 4
= the number of tax inspectors over the number of taxpayers.
Ratio 5
= the number of audit departments over the number of taxpayers.
Ratio 6
= the percentage of inspectors with a bachelor’s degree or higher.
Ratio 7
= the percentage of inspectors with qualification as certified public
accountants.
Ratio 8
= the percentage of inspectors with qualifications as certified tax agents.
Ratio 9
= the percentage of inspectors with qualifications as lawyers.
Ratio 10 = the dollar amount of tax deficiencies settled over the amount of
regional tax revenue.
Ratio 11 = the dollar amount of surcharges, penalties, and fines over the amount
of regional
tax revenue.
o
Ratio 12 = the dollar amount of surcharges, penalties, and fines over the number
tax audits conducted.
of
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel B: Factor loading matrix for tax enforcement
Factor Loading Matrix
Variable

Rotated Factor Loadings

Factor Scoring Coefficients

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Uniqueness

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Ratio 1
Ratio 2
Ratio 3
Ratio 4
Ratio 5
Ratio 6

0.665
0.749
0.744
0.901
0.777
-0.505

-0.111
-0.154
0.191
0.056
0.058
0.043

0.197
0.304
0.119
0.071
0.020
-0.267

0.697
0.810
0.738
0.879
0.746
-0.563

0.048
0.132
-0.224
-0.210
-0.217
-0.094

-0.068
-0.047
0.100
-0.059
-0.069
-0.054

0.507
0.324
0.396
0.179
0.392
0.672

0.201
0.240
0.204
0.239
0.199
-0.171

0.063
0.111
-0.060
-0.049
-0.061
-0.081

-0.001
0.017
0.072
0.004
-0.007
-0.053

Ratio 7
Ratio 8

-0.279
-0.348

-0.466
-0.610

0.695
0.480

-0.043
-0.166

0.872
0.827

0.127
-0.106

0.221
0.277

0.046
-0.003

0.418
0.382

0.085
-0.032

Ratio 9
Ratio 10
Ratio 11
Ratio 12

-0.192
-0.182
-0.182
-0.480

-0.527
0.749
0.749
0.412

0.454
0.612
0.612
-0.022

-0.029
-0.025
-0.024
-0.482

0.716
0.000
0.000
-0.163

-0.085
0.984
0.984
0.377

0.480
0.031
0.031
0.599

0.031
0.035
0.035
-0.133

0.338
0.028
0.028
-0.096

-0.020
0.466
0.466
0.153

Eigenvalue
Proportion
Cumulative

3.761
0.313
0.313

2.241
0.187
0.500

1.890
0.158
0.658
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel C: Mean (median) values of tax enforcement metrics for tax-increase and tax-decrease firms
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
PROBABILITY
EXPERTISE
OUTCOME
ENFORCEMENT
Sample Size

0.434 (0.000)
0.605 (1.000)
0.492 (0.000)
0.568 (1.000)
650

firms

firms

0.426 (0.000)
0.579 (1.000)
0.465 (0.000)
0.545 (1.000)
387

0.445 (0.000)
0.643 (1.000)
0.532 (1.000)
0.601 (1.000)
263

Difference
0.019 (0.000 )
0.064 (0.000 )
0.067* (1.000)*
0.056 (0.000)

t-value

z-stat.

0.467 (0.467)
1.633 (1.631)
1.683 (1.681)
1.403 (1.402)

Variables Definitions
PROBABILITY = the probability of taxpayers being audited and prosecuted by tax authorities for the region (Factor1).
EXPERTISE = the sufficiency and expertise of tax inspectors and audit agents for the region (Factor2).
OUTCOME = the audit outcomes or consequences (including tax deficiencies settled and overdue payment surcharges,
penalties, and fines) for the region (Factor3).
ENFORCEMENT = tax enforcement, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the average ranking of the sum of the ranks for
PROBABILITY, EXPERTISE, and OUTCOME is above the country level median and 0 otherwise.
*represents significance at the 10% level.
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Table 5 Mean (Median) Values of ETR5 and Control Variables for Tax-Increase and Tax-Decrease firms
All
ETR5
LAG_INST
SOE
ROA
SIZE
LEVERAGE
TOBIN’S Q
LOSS
NCF
CAPITAL_INT
INVENTORY_INT
INTANGIBLE
N

0.229 (0.204)
0.139
0.697
0.041
21.691
0.515
2.101
0.080

(0.056)
(1.000)
(0.038)
(21.632)
(0.532)
(1.844)
(0.000)

0.089 (0.078)
0.280 (0.247)
0.174 (0.140)
0.043 (0.027)
650

Tax-Increase firms

Tax-Decrease firms

0.114 (0.137)
0.137
0.718
0.043
21.709
0.509
2.085
0.072

0.398 (0.333)

(0.058)
(1.000)
(0.042)
(21.626)
(0.519)
(1.819)
(0.000)

0.142
0.665
0.037
21.664
0.525
2.123
0.091

0.077 (0.074)
0.274 (0.240)
0.169 (0.143)
0.045 (0.030)
387

(0.055)
(1.000)
(0.034)
(21.637)
(0.559)
(1.865)
(0.000)

0.106 (0.086)
0.288 (0.262)
0.181 (0.139)
0.040 (0.024)
263

** , *** represents significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Refer to appendix A for variable definitions.

70

Difference
0.284*** (0.196)***

t-value z-stat.
26.354 (21.609)

0.004
-0.053
-0.006
-0.046
0.016
0.038
0.019

(-0.003)
(0.000)
(-0.008)**
(0.011)
(0.040)
(0.046)
(0.000)

0.292
-1.442
-1.377
-0.594
1.192
0.553
0.871

(-0.322)
(-1.441)
(-2.100)
(0.021)
(1.406)
(0.630)
(0.871)

0.029
0.014
0.012
-0.005

(0.012)
(0.023)
(-0.004)
(-0.006)**

1.380
0.979
1.038
-1.303

(1.446)
(0.966)
(0.276)
(-2.178)

Table 6 Results of regressing DCA on QUALITY_HIGH and ENFORCEMENT
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
firms
firms
QUALITY_HIGH
ENFORCEMENT
LAG_INST
SOE
ROA
SIZE
LEVERAGE
TOBIN’S Q
LOSS
NCF
CAPITAL_INT
INVENTORY
INTANGIBLE
LAG_DA
INTERCEPT
INDUSTRY
N
Adj_R2
F
p

-0.015
(-1.65)*
0.006
(0.91)
0.018
(0.76)
-0.006
(-0.75)
0.180
(1.56)
0.007
(1.58)
-0.051
(-2.26)**
-0.010
(-1.86)*
-0.006
(-0.34)
-0.112
(-4.62)***
0.033
(1.47)
0.234
(4.97)***
-0.063
(-0.98)
-0.108
(-1.61)
-0.185
(-1.77)*
YES
650
0.216
4.681
0.00

-0.020
(-2.03)**
-0.006
(-0.75)
0.029
(0.98)
0.006
(0.56)
0.135
(1.11)
0.008
(1.67)*
-0.045
(-1.62)
-0.004
(-0.62)
-0.017
(-0.66)
-0.095
(-2.88)***
0.007
(0.25)
0.231
(3.52)***
-0.056
(-0.67)
-0.126
(-1.34)
-0.213
(-1.79)*
YES
387
0.189
2.924
0.00

-0.008
(-0.42)
0.026
(2.08)**
0.025
(0.59)
-0.025
(-2.01)**
0.228
(0.89)
0.001
(0.17)
-0.035
(-0.75)
-0.020
(-1.89)*
-0.002
(-0.06)
-0.153
(-3.62)***
0.057
(1.41)
0.239
(3.43)***
-0.166
(-1.47)
-0.100
(-1.13)
-0.169
(-0.88)
YES
263
0.228
2.637
0.00

*, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7 Sensitivity Tests
Panel A: Control for lagged ROA in discretionary current accruals estimation
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
firms
firms
QUALITY_HIGH
-0.015
-0.020
-0.008
(-1.69)*
(-2.06)**
(-0.40)
ENFORCEMENT
0.006
-0.007
0.027
(0.87)
(-0.82)
(2.14)**
CONTROL VARIABLES
Included
Included
Included
N
650
387
263
Adj_R2
0.210
0.176
0.230
F
4.565
2.736
2.797
P
0.00
0.00
0.00
Panel B: Use of 2007-year ex-post realized tax enforcement
All
Tax-Increase
firms

Tax-Decrease
firms

QUALITY_HIGH

-0.015
(-1.66)*

-0.020
(-2.05)**

-0.008
(-0.41)

ENFORCEMENT

0.002

-0.016

0.025

(0.23)

(-1.84)*

(2.04)**

Included

Included

Included

650

387

263

Adj_R2

0.215

0.196

0.227

F

4.662

3.098

2.611

p

0.00

0.00

0.00

Tax-Increase
firms
-0.020
(-2.08)**
-0.008
(-0.92)
0.002
(0.73)
Included
387
0.188
2.957
0.00

Tax-Decrease
firms
-0.010
(-0.48)
0.028
(2.27)**
-0.003
(-0.76)
Included
263
0.227
2.598
0.00

CONTROL VARIABLES
N

Panel C: Controlling for NERI index

QUALITY_HIGH
ENFORCEMENT
INDEX
CONTROL VARIABLES
N
Adj_R2
F
p

All
-0.015
(-1.65)*
0.007
(0.93)
-0.001
(-0.24)
Included
650
0.214
4.562
0.00
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Panel D: Use of applicable tax rates for sample partition

QUALITY_HIGH
ENFORCEMENT
CONTROL VARIABLES
N
Adj_R2
F
P

All
-0.016
(-1.78)*
0.006
(0.89)
Included
644
0.200
4.374
0.00

Tax-Increase
firms
-0.023
(-1.67)*
-0.012
(-1.10)
Included
302
0.212
4.835
0.00

Tax-Decrease
firms
-0.012
(-0.93)
0.020
(2.17)**
Included
342
0.206
3.497
0.00

Panel E: Use of 5-year long-term ETR and 2008-year’s ETR for sample partition
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
firms
firms
QUALITY_HIGH
-0.015
-0.029
-0.012
(-1.70)*
(-1.82)*
(-1.13)
ENFORCEMENT
0.007
-0.022
0.016
(0.94)
(-1.63)
(1.92)*
CONTROL VARIABLES
Included
Included
Included
N
648
209
439
Adj_R2
0.216
0.156
0.253
F
6.933
2.279
5.940
p
0.00
0.00
0.00
Panel F: Omission of firms in Agricultural and Information Technology
industries
Tax-Increase
Tax-Decrease
All
firms
firms
QUALITY_HIGH
-0.012
-0.017
-0.007
(-1.31)
(-1.67)*
(-0.38)
ENFORCEMENT
0.008
-0.005
0.026
(1.12)
(-0.61)
(2.08)**
CONTROL VARIABLES
Included
Included
Included
N
608
350
258
Adj_R2
0.215
0.182
0.232
F
4.483
2.687
2.672
P
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Panel G: Drop firms in western region

QUALITY_HIGH
ENFORCEMENT
CONTROL VARIABLES
N
Adj_R2
F
P

All
-0.013
(-1.43)
0.009
(1.15)
Included
556
0.213
4.139
0.00

Tax-Increase
firms
-0.021
(-2.03)**
-0.011
(-1.22)
Included
314
0.192
2.609
0.00

Tax-Decrease
firms
-0.007
(-0.31)
0.037
(2.85)***
Included
242
0.244
2.628
0.00

*, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
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